

Identity Issues and Intercultural Challenges: A European and Global Perspective on Peace in the World

Selected Essays

Edited by
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Preface

The title of a book should be the last thing to write, after all else is in place, as the roof is on top when the house has already been built from its foundations. But, as I know from my experience of aged scholar, it happens many times that the title comes first, being the inspirational motive for writing a book on this or that topic. In such cases a title works like a project. Again as with the example of the house that is already standing in the architect's design.

However, when I was asked to edit this book from the "Al-Babtain Cultural Foundation," no precise project or title was on the table yet, apart from a general indication of the thematic area in which to dig. Therefore the first and indeed preliminary concern was to find a guide for choosing contributions to be assembled in a book. Not only in terms of coherence with a topic, but much more in terms of a wider possible range of points of views from which to look at it. Therefore, the search for contributions went hand in hand with the search for a title under which to collect them together. Thus, along with the selecting process of contributions, came out this title, or project, where identity issues are associated with intercultural challenges, both viewed from a European and global perspective.

To be sure, what really matters is above all the message of the book: what can be expected that it will contribute to information, discussion and reflection by its readers and the public in general.

And one thing has become clear to me, once all the contributions were in place, side by side: that this book is a book on "peace," as heralded by its subtitle (not by chance, added after having meditated on it, while writing this Preface).

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A quick review of the essays here collected shows that they deal with – and are written basically on the backdrop of – the topic of diversity of cultures, within which identities of individuals as well as

of minority or majority groups are confronted and exposed to external influences and internal constraints in today's global world characterised by an ever growing planetary interdependence. They concentrate on a variety of conceptual issues and challenges, ranging from moral to legal theory, politico-institutional settings, educational tools, socio-political participation and integration strategies, philosophical queries, also supported by an additional touch of references to cognitive neurosciences.

This multidisciplinary approach is one with the complexity of the topic just mentioned, and reflects its problematic aspects of both method and merit.

Furthermore the joint reference to European and global perspective alike is allusive to parallel scenarios. In the sense that Europe, because of its integration process, is emerging as one of the major global actor, while becoming a play field of new trends and transformative dynamics of socio-economic, political and cultural reach, such as the competitive tensions of free market and persons' greater movement ability at large, the impact of information and communication technologies, migration flows, and the progressive hybridization and mixing between populations, all of them attributable to the phenomenon of globalisation spreading all over the world (developed and developing).

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As it is known, the European integration process arises in the early 1950s from the ruins of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states, whose dissipation after Second World War brought to light the idea that peace must be taken as the foundation of the international order, and not as its byproduct only, together with the need for a system of multi-level and supra-national governance, based on inter-state solidarity and cooperation, democratic principles, the respect of human rights and the rule of law.

In this regard, the act that gave rise to the process of European integration in the middle of the last century begins by affirming that: *"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of*

creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it." (Schuman Declaration, 9th May 1950). Since then such "creative efforts" have been developed in an ongoing process aimed to realize "*an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe*" (as stated in the European Union treaties). Needless to say, the biggest effort to be accomplished rests with the aim of integrating diverse peoples, cultures and traditions; the effort of being "*united in diversity*" (as reads the European motto).

This change of historical paradigm has highlighted the problem of individual and collective identity with reference to the idea of nationality as the belonging to a nation-state (homeland), embedded in its set of culture and tradition. In particular, as far as Europe is concerned, one may observe a sense of decline if not of dissolution of the idea of nation-state as a self-contained territory closed within its borders. A phenomenon that has created fears and hostility feelings among people, especially in some European and Western countries. More recent times are witnessing the reaction of populist movements and nationalist parties against what is perceived, in a growing number of both intellectual and popular environs, as the threat of reducing socio-cultural varieties due to an homogenisation process aimed to standardize different traditions, lifestyles, social norms. But their arguments appear to be short-sighted as they are motivated by diffidence, if not intolerance, as regards the "other" (foreigner), and are mainly focused on revival of securitarian policies based on closure of borders.

Nowadays, another effort is needed, as a consequence of the phenomenon of massive migration flows that affect, one way or another, the socio-economic environ for the generations to come, not only in Europe but also nearby in the entire Euro-Mediterranean area. An area widely understood in a geopolitical meaning ranging from Middle East to North Africa, including sub-Saharan countries, down to the Horn of Africa, and to Gulf countries too, as one of the most strategic areas in the worldwide balance of international relations.

Having in mind this scenario, it is fair to acknowledge that the migration phenomenon, with its diasporic proportions, has acquired

a global dimension which can no longer be looked at as a purely national responsibility of single states. But it demands a much more comprehensive as well as cooperative way based on the assumption that migration flows will need to be tackled as the new normal of a “world on the move”, for a long time ahead.

And this brings about again the issue of globalisation.

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Indeed, since the last decades of past century, the world has changed dramatically: getting increasingly connected as fragmented, composite as unequal, uniform as contradictory and conflictual, in a mix of positive and negative effects with consequent uncertainties and insecurities.

Such context, where ongoing globalisation processes far from being the end of history (“one size fits all”), shows instead the existence of a variety of worlds living under contrasting forces and trends, respectively of unification and diversification, posits the need for a way ahead, beyond globalization. Because globalization, with its claim to being good in itself, is part of the problem, not the solution.

As it is true that globalisation has reduced and is reducing absolute poverty, though at the cost of greater inequalities between countries and peoples, it is also true that, rather than being fought, globalization needs to be better governed.

The point at issue and the great challenge of our days for the sake of a peaceful world, to the extent to which globalisation has not been able to balance together multiculturalism with socio-economic integration between peoples and countries, is how to manage it. In order to make cultural, religious and linguistic diversity a true resource for dialogue, mutual understanding and peaceful relationships in the cities and societies of today’s world.

Peace cannot but stand together with mutual understanding, dialogue and solidarity between peoples.

At world level, peace and solidarity need a system of governance based on international and supra-national organisations, working

through the use of common resources and policies. But even more important are the national and local (territorial) roots of such system, which must be fed with educational tools, socio-political actions and legal instruments (including individual and group rights) based on shared values, sustained by individual and group identities based on civic awareness, active participation and intercultural dialogue.

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This book and its message are about all of these issues and challenges, in order to offer to its readers information, observations and considerations as a source of inspiration and reflection.

To conclude, not as editor, but as reader, I wish to share with fellow readers (hopefully) of this book, and the public at large, a final sentence which tries to sum up a personal belief that I drew from the contributions here collected.

The safeguarding of global biodiversity, with regard not only to nature and natural resources, but also to cultural heritages, along with different economic and social environments, as it is essential to preserve the planetary ecosystem, and avoid conflicts, it is also helpful for counteracting the tendency to build walls and close borders. And this is today the most effective way to maintain peace, enhancing progress and prosperity and giving a better chance of future to the peoples all around the world.

Rome, 12th June 2017

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Citizenship and Citizenships *ad omnes includendos*: A Human Rights Approach

Antonio Papisca

Abstract

The starting assumption is that intercultural dialogue, to be fruitful, must be developed from a basic code of values, that aside from being universal in character and therefore possible to share, must also be a trans-cultural facilitator. Arguably, the international law of human rights provides the axio-legal paradigm for the human-centric foundation of citizenship, then for its re-definition as plural citizenship whose references are no longer only the ius sanguinis and the ius soli, but primarily the ius humanitatis. It presents the human rights approach to citizenship ad omnes includendos, that is for the inclusion of all human beings, as “members of the human family” in a large and multi-level space. The horizon for active citizenship is much broader than the territorial dimension of the traditional nation-state; it is the European and world space of internationally recognised human rights. In this light, the European integration process and system, being a laboratory of «constituent» activities, provide an evolutionary context in which new citizenship and inclusion practices can be built. Thus an implementation of plural citizenship is strictly linked to re-launching a democratic practice beyond the national borders, and rescuing statehood providing it with new sustainable dimensions. Arguments are raised in favour of the thesis according to which the promotion of universal citizenship strengthens the eligibility of local government institutions to have a more visible place in the architecture and functioning of the world political system. Emphasis is put on the primacy of the international law of human rights over national and sub-national legal systems. Human rights mainstreaming in local and international public policies is considered one of the greatest challenges for reshaping and developing inclusive infrastructures.

Antonio Papisca

In this large context of multiple challenges and opportunities, education is asked to help maturing a new “transcend civic identity”.

1. Challenges to an (only) national citizenship

The traditional concept of citizenship, marked by the horizon of the nation-state, is questioned not only for ethical reasons but also because of the large processes of structural change that are transversal to the different national realities that affect, in a direct way, both the sphere of public institutions and the daily life of persons and groups. I am referring to complex interdependence, transnationalisation of relationships and structures, permanent organisation of cooperation in the intergovernmental and non-governmental field, economic globalisation, internationalisation of human rights, and of course to European integration as carried through the institutional architecture of the European Union. In this planetary context that launches positive and negative challenges, governance is facing a deep crisis, and the experience of democracy is suffering even in the countries with a longstanding tradition on the matter. The crisis of governance affects not only the routine capacities of national governments – in this case it would be a conjunctural crisis – but also the very “form” of the state as characterised by the dimensions of nationality, sovereignty, border, and army. We are facing a “structural” crisis of statehood as it was being constructed and carried out in the last centuries. The crisis of (the practice of) democracy is strictly linked with the structural crisis of national statehood. Crucial decisions are increasingly taken in extra-national contexts: in a transparent way if we refer to international institutions, in a less transparent way in other venues. The space of nation-state is no longer sufficient to assure the physiologic life of democracy because what should be legitimated, supervised and controlled is no longer,

to a great extent, within the domestic jurisdiction of the individual states. Hence citizenship rights are in danger, even the most consolidated rights. If Parliament and the Executive of my country no longer have the real power to decide, what is the meaning of political elections, of my democratic role to legitimate and participate? If the state and other public institutions withdraw from their welfare commitments, giving up the protection of economic and social rights, what is the difference between being and not being a citizen? If the nation-state is unable to provide all those living in its space security from transnational organised crime and wars, what is the difference between being and not being a citizen? If using the remaining part of its power, the national-sovereign-armed-border-marked statehood succumbs to temptation of exasperating its authoritarian (punitive, repressive) functions, which and how many constitutional guarantees will survive? Why and how to live in such a permanent “state of exception”?

A useful way of addressing this magmatic situation is to reconceptualise citizenship starting from below, that is from the roots of the political community up to the governance institutions, to see the latter in the light of their *telos* and democratic legitimacy before considering them in the light of authority, power and capacities. Such bottom-up operation is even more urgent if we consider the heavy conflicts that are still going on and even increasing in many territories where different ethnic, religious and cultural groups have been living there for ages, with xenophobia and discrimination growing in the countries where large groups of human beings, bringing different cultures, are entering our territories and rightly advocate the same citizenship rights as the nationals.

Hopefully the world scenario is not entirely negative. Even the dynamics of planetary interdependence has a two-fold dimension, a positive and one negative, where the positive lies mainly in the increasing awareness that we can actually pursue objectives of global governance and use, in a joint and solidaristic way, international and supra-national institutions and decision-making processes

to manage and equitably distribute the global goods that are included in the interconnected baskets of human security and human development. These positive aspects are more than mere “interstices” for peaceful changes.

In particular, the internationalisation of human rights and the process of European integration provide several strategic opportunities to re-define the concept of citizenship and to open new paths for its practice. The first provides the legal-axiological paradigm for the human-centric foundation of citizenship, the second the real space to exercise the (new) citizenship, both elements offer great opportunities to develop education as a creative process.

The international legal recognition of human rights allows us, I would say obliges us, to re-construct citizenship starting, as already stated, not from state institutions (the traditional citizenship top-down), but from its original holder, the human being (citizenship bottom up): I mean citizenship not as a status *octroyé* by the state, but as an endowment that is inherent to the human being, equal for all human beings as members of the human family. Needless to point out that bills and decrees are required to regulate the practice of citizenships within the states, though they should be devised respecting the principles of universal citizenship, primarily the principle of non-discrimination.

The European integration process and the EU institution system allow the experimenting of a new, enlarged citizenship in an evolutionary context of “institution building” which strongly requires substantive legitimacy, participation and active citizenship as foundational elements for the construction of the macro polity.

Both realities, the human rights internationalisation and the European integration, do provide further logical and empirical evidence as well as new dimensions to the categories of “identity” and “belonging”:

- a universal ontological parameter: the identity of human being (*personne humaine*) as member of the “human family”, whose original status is now formally acknowledged by the international

law of human rights, beyond and above the individual domestic jurisdictions;

- a spatial and functional reference: the identity of being “European” – to complement other more restricted identities – and the belonging to the European space and hopefully, to the EU polity.

Both references keep citizenship and governance institutions in strict relationship. And this is consistent with the intrinsic logic of any serious educational project.

2. Human rights, Plenitudo iuris

The legal recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the international level is the paramount outcome of the long historic movement that brought democratic constitutions inside states; a movement marked by people suffering and claiming, intellectual endeavours, mass mobilisations, and political commitment. With the United Nations Charter of 1945, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the “constitutional rationale” has been extended to a world level, overcoming the borders of state sovereignty. For the first time in the history of humanity, the human being has been recognised as a subject, not as a mere object, of international law: or better, as the original subject of law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration is explicit regarding the “inherence” of fundamental rights: «All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and in rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards each other in a spirit of brotherhood».

Furthermore, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration states that «the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world». This means that human dignity is assumed as the founding value of world order and of whatever legal and political system. According to the in-

ternational law in force, and in perfect consonance with domestic “constitutional” law, sovereignty belongs to the peoples and to the human family as a whole, because each one of their members is endowed with inherent human dignity and with equal fundamental rights. We could rightly say that the human-centric rationale of domestic constitutional law is now being reinforced by the “new” international law, a true *ius novum universale*, or pan-human law, that has become a comprehensive and coherent *corpus* of principles and norms that complement and update the first part of the UN Charter. The DNA of a just, peaceful and democratic world order is made up of basic principles that include: the universality of human rights, their interdependence and indivisibility, the indissociability of women human rights from internationally recognised human rights, the proscription of war, the prohibition of the use of force for the settlement of international disputes, the rule of law, democracy both as a right and the natural method for implementing human rights, the universality of international criminal justice, the international personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide¹.

International legal recognition entails that states and any other organised system should be considered as “derived” entities, instrumental to pursuing the primary aims related to human rights and fundamental freedoms². To underline the native primacy of the human being over derived systems, Article 28 of the Universal Declaration proclaims the right to positive peace as a fundamental right: «Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised». The purport of this article is absolutely revolutionary if we consider that the right to peace (*ius ad pacem*), together with the right to war (*ius ad bellum*), is one of the traditional strong en-

¹ A. Papisca, *Il Diritto della dignità umana. Riflessioni sulla globalizzazione dei diritti umani*, Venezia, Marsilio, 2011.

² J. Maritain, *Man and the State*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951.

dowments of state sovereignty. Also by virtue of this article, that highlights and reinforces the purport of other pertinent norms of the United Nations Charter, it can be argued that if peace is recognised as a human right, the right to war cannot but disappear from the dictionary of state endowments and of inter-state relationships, with the logical consequence that the right of states to peace has become the duty of peace (*officium pacis*)³. Indeed, to this regard it must be recalled that on December 19, 2016, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted by a majority of its Member States the “Declaration on the Right to Peace”, whose article 1 reads: «Everyone has the right to enjoy peace such that all human rights are promoted and protected and development is fully realized.»

States, the inter-state system, the UN, the EU, as “artificial” systems created for a pre-established *facere*, do not have in themselves the *raison d’être* and, of course, are not provided with “free will” as in the case of the human being. Since human beings, wherever they live, have the same basic needs that are recognised as fundamental rights by the international law in force, all states and international organisations have to comply with the same human-centric deontology.

When a legal system founds itself on human rights, it enters a new stage of human-centric maturation that we can easily call of *plenitudo iuris* (“law plenitude”). The international law of human rights indicates that this achievement is also marking the world system. Being the “ferryman” that brings universal human ethics into

³ A. Papisca, “The Nightmare of an Armed Multilateralism à la carte Urges for a UNESCO Declaration on the Human Right to Peace”, European University Center for Peace Studies - EPU (ed.), “Collection of 100 Study Papers and Essays, 2001-2005, of UNESCO Chairs in Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance”, Stadtschlaining, EPU, 2006, pp. 289-297; *Idem*, *The Human Right to Peace Is Putting the Sincerity of the Peace-loving States to the Test*, in *Pace diritti umani – Peace Human Rights*, 2-3/2013, pp. 133-145; D. Roche, *The Right to Peace Takes Shape*, in *Pace diritti umani – Peace Human Rights*, 2-3/2013, pp. 41-49.

the political and economic arenas, it is also the core of any genuine educational strategy. To this very regard, the Universal Declaration explicitly emphasizes that its effectiveness should be pursued primarily through teaching and education. It should be pointed out that the pan-human law, as the *noyveau dur* of the human rights knowledge – *le savoir des droits de la personne* – is a particularly useful tool for pedagogical purposes because it permits to refer to values that, for the very fact that are included in international legal norms, cannot but be assumed as less arbitrary than others.

Europe is certainly the historical source of both the coherent philosophy and the juridical language and technicalities of human rights, but the culture of human rights as it is currently developing and disseminating is the result of the confluence of intellectual (and political) contributions of the different regions of the world. For instance, the principle of interdependence and indivisibility of human rights was formally set forth in December 1977 by the UN General Assembly upon proposal and pressure coming from non-European countries⁴. The same principle has been included in the Vienna Declaration issued by the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in 1993. Nowadays, owing to the very paradigm of universally recognised human rights, we are in the middle of a process of cross fertilisation of cultures and political visions. In this “universal yard” a rich variety of actors are playing significant roles: governments, in-

⁴ UN-GA Resolution 32/130 of 16 December 1977, which asserts (para. 1): «a) All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights; b) The full realisation of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible; the achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social development, as recognised by the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968». This principle, that meets the requirements of the human being «integrality», is included in the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights of 1993.

tergovernmental organisation, non-governmental organisations, academics, and supra-national courts (with their creative case law). Thousands of “institutional” human rights monitors are currently deployed in field operations world-wide. The “human rights dimension” is mainstreaming the mandate and the operational structure of the UN military operations. Amnesty International and a myriad of civil society organisations act along a *continuum* of roles (including the delicate role of *amici curiae*) that start in local communities and go up to the sanctuaries of international politics. Starting from Rio 1992, the big world conferences, convened by the United Nations, mobilise large civil society from all continents and regions, and provide the human rights culture the opportunity to express itself in the form of “value politics” and of trans-national participatory democracy. In fact, the human rights paradigm constitutes a code of shared symbols that are used by significant actors of global civil society to communicate among themselves and with national and international institutions. It should be stressed that the topic of international legality based on human rights and multi-lateralism has become familiar to the trans-national world of civil society not only for denouncing, with competence and full legitimacy, dictatorships, hegemonisms, economics without justice, Realpolitik behaviours, but also for conceiving and proposing suitable policies, institutions, positive measures, and good practices to achieve goals of global (good) governance.

The passionate and creative reality of civil society organisations and movements acting across and beyond state borders demonstrate that civic and political roles, that is active citizenship, are no longer limited to the intra-state space, and that a suitable “geometry” for democracy, as advanced before, is really extending and building up in the world space. The traditional inter-state system was like an exclusive club of “rulers for rulers” the nourishment of which was assured by what cybernetics call “withinputs” (that is, demands and supports by rulers for rulers, summitry practice), not by physio- logical “inputs” coming from the “ruled people”, that is

from those human beings that we call “citizens”. Now the very “citizens”, especially through transnational organisations and movements, have visibility and legitimate room – already *de iure condito* – in the world constitutional space. Democratising international institutions and politics in the true sense of democracy – that means not “one country, one vote” (a procedural translation of the old principle of states sovereign equality), but more direct legitimacy of the relevant multilateral bodies and more effective political participation in their functioning – has become the new frontier for any significant human-centric and peaceful development of governance. Advocating an international-transnational democracy is already putting new citizenship into practice.

This large mobilisation is further legitimated, in a very specific and innovative way, by the United Nations Declaration «on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms», endorsed by the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144 (9 December 1998). By virtue of this instrument, known as the “Magna Charta of the Human Rights Defenders”, «everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels» (Article 1). Emphasis is put on the right to “strive” (this verb is stronger than to act or to operate), to overcome any domestic border. Article 7 states that «everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to develop and discuss new human rights ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance». Article 18, points 2 and 3, goes on further: «Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organisations have an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organisations also have an important role and a

responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realised». Needless to point out that the tasks relating to the defence of democracy and the construction of world order have a high political profile. Reference to civic and “public” roles of individuals and associations is clearly to be carried out from the city up to the world sanctuaries. The only legitimacy condition that is specified by the Declaration is that such roles should be realized “peacefully”, that is in perfect consistency with the logic of human promotion.

3. *Citizenship as the tree of citizenships*

According to international law that recognises human rights, citizenship should be defined as the legal status of the human being (*statut juridique de la personne humaine en tant que telle*) in the space that is proper of that law. As already pointed out, this enlarged constitutional space coincides with the vital space of all members of the human family. The legal status of the human being does not stem from the anagraphical power of the state, it is a citizenship not *octroyée* but simply “recognised”, for the holder is an “original” holder, not the “national” or the “subject” of whatever state. All human beings, being formally recognised as born with dignity and rights (Universal Declaration), are by nature citizens of the planet earth. The primary or universal citizenship is a common citizenship. Anagraphical, national or European citizenships are secondary or complementary citizenships, as such they should be consistent with the original (universal) legal status of the human being.

A metaphor could serve our didactical purpose: citizenship is like a tree, whose trunk and roots are the juridical status of the human being, the universal citizenship (*la citoyenneté de la personne*), and

the branches are national and sub-national citizenships. Citizenship is a plural conceptual and legal category.

National citizenship is traditionally theorised and taught as a matter of collective identification *ad intra*, around the symbols of national history and national statehood, and of exclusion *ad extra*, with respect to what does not fit in with national borders. It should be reminded that the paradigmatic French Declaration of 1789 referred to the *droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, which gave way to interpreting fundamental rights as a privilege for those who already are anagraphical citizens of a particular state. Its implicit rationale is *ad alios excludendos*, as such contradictory to the immanent universality of human rights.

As a merely rhetorical exercise, we could even wonder whether in the era of planetary interdependence and international law of human rights, the *ad alios excludendos* philosophy makes any sense. The answer has already been advanced by the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration which both assume human rights as the inherent rights of the human being as such, not as the rights of the human being and of the citizen. In the pertinent international legal instruments there is no distinction between human being and citizen, the human being is originally the citizen, and vice versa. The philosophy of the new international law is clearly *ad omnes includendos*. Consistent with this approach is also the answer from a sociological point of view, saying that processes of adaptive socialisation should be facilitated in order to make individuals, families, groups aware of the magnitude of the present world challenges, and capable of actively participating in the construction of internal and international peace.

In the current context of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural conflicts that need new forms of political organisation of the world, citizenship should be considered as an evolutionary concept, as is the case for security and development, I mean in a multi-dimensional vein. Analogies are clear and convincing. Until recently, security was meant as “state”, “national” and “military” security, aimed at pursu-

ing the national interest, nowadays we speak of human security as primarily “people” security, a multi-dimensional concept including social, economic, and environmental aspects, as well as reference to a collective and supra-national machinery⁵. In the years following World War II, development was addressed as an economic concept for purposes of quantitative growth; today we say “human development” relating to a rich basket of both quantitative and qualitative indicators, relying on the principle of the centrality of the human being as emphasized by the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986.

Of course, the discourse raises serious, even dramatic problems if we consider that, from a historical point of view, national citizenships are pre-existent to universal citizenship. The big challenge that lies ahead is for culture, politics and education to help change minds, harmonise national legal systems with the international law of human rights, carry out adequate national and international social policies, and foster the inclusion of all in the framework of a multi-level architecture of governance. A new frontier for human promotion and democracy has been opened.

⁵ On human security see S. Alkire, “Concept of Human Security”, in L.C. Chen, S. Fukuda-Parr and E. Seidensticker (eds.), *Human Security in a Global World*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 15-40; J.P. Burgess and T. Owen (eds.), “What Is Human Security?”, in «Special Section, Security Dialogue», vol. 35, n. 3, 2005, pp. 345-372; R. Pettman, Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies, in «Cambridge Review of International Affairs», vol. 18, n. 1, 2005, pp. 137-150. See also the Report of the UN Secretary General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, March 2005; Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003; United Nations General Assembly, *Human Security*, Report of the Secretary General, Doc. A/64/701, 8 March 2010.

4. *European citizenship and human rights: which consistency?*

The first most significant message stemming from both system and process of European integration can be summarised as follows⁶. Since it was possible to overcome territorial borders and selfishness of states sovereignty, it should also be possible to overcome prejudices and cleavages amongst groups and peoples. It is a peace and liberation message that provides “national” citizens real opportunities to enter new territorial and functional spaces for human development, human security, democratic roles, and to experiment new forms of statehood, of “sustainable statehood”. We should not forget that the European integration project, as it was imagined by the inspired “fathers” of Europe, is a true peace-building project. The method to carry out the project was in accordance with the functionalist approach of gradualism, this explains why the key-subjects considered for integration purposes were entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and lobbyists, not primarily the human being as such. But as we know, since the beginning, the institutional architecture and functioning of the European system, even its founding principles have been involved and metabolised in a permanent evolutionary process. The so-called democratic deficit with regard to the European Parliament power was soon raised. It was realised that it would have been impossible to speak of supra-national democracy and the rule of law without linking them to the paradigm of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The “EU citizenship” was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, exactly forty years after the first European Community Treaty. By the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, human rights were proclaimed as part of the founding principles of the European Union. Moreover, on 10 December 2000, the Presidents of the European Parliament, of the Council and of the European Com-

⁶ A. Papisca, “Reforming the United Nations by the Convention Method: Learning from the European Union”, in *The Federalist Debate*, vol. XIX, n. 1, 2006, pp. 8-12.

mission, jointly proclaimed the “EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, that was prepared by the *ad hoc* European Convention. The Charter, to which the Lisbon Treaty (2007, entered into force in 2009) has finally conferred the value of primary EU law, is at the same time an achievement, because it makes the matter more coherent and systematic, and a starting point for further developments towards the full “constitutionalisation” of the EU system, in particular providing a suitable ground for a more correct foundation for EU citizenship.

In fact, human rights issues were addressed in the European system much before the 1990s, thanks to the enlightened case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and to the passionate advocacy of the European Parliament. Furthermore we should not forget that human rights were included in the first Draft European Constitution (Altiero Spinelli Draft), endorsed by the European Parliament in 1984, but not by the Council. The European Commission, mainly through its “unit on human rights and democratization”, has been very active in the field, providing political and financial support to NGOs and universities for projects on information and education to human rights and democratisation⁷.

Since 1999, the Human Rights Reports of the European Parliament, have been accompanied by the annual EU Human Rights Report, prepared by the Council and discussed at the annual session of

⁷ The “European Master in Human Rights and Democratisation”, that started in 1997 under the supervision of the University of Padua-Human Rights Centre in partnership with 10 European universities, is a significant, positive example of “infrastructural investment” of the European Commission. The partner universities are now 41. In 2003 the «European Joint Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation» was formally established; in the same year the participating universities created the “European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation” (EIUC), a university association endowed with legal personality, based in Venice. For more information on the first six year of functioning of this educational undertaking see A. Papisca, M. Nowak and H. Fischer, “Curriculum Development and Academic Institution Building in the European Union: The Experience of the European Master in Human Rights and Democratisation”, EMA, in *Pace diritti umani/Peace human rights*, vol. 1, n. 3, 2004, pp. 123-146.

the “EU Human Rights Forum” that takes place under the EU Presidency, with the participation of representatives of the EU member states, EU institutions and organs, NGOs and academics. In the field of external relations, human rights, linked with education and civil society structures, have high visibility in the framework of development cooperation with the ACP countries (Lomé and now Cotonou system). Since the early 1990s, a “human rights clause” was included in the treaties with third states establishing that implementation can be suspended if the concerned state does not comply with human rights and democratic principles. The important role of the EU institutions in fostering the establishment and the functioning of the International Criminal Court should also be emphasized.

The European Union is endowing itself with a specific machinery dealing with human rights. The European Parliament has the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Petitions, the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Human Rights Unit at the Secretariat General.

The Council has a specialised standing human rights working group (COHOM). The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has a EU Special Representative for Human Rights. The European Commission manages the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which came into force on 1 January 2007, as a concrete expression of the EU’s commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world. The European External Action Service has a Directorate on Human Rights, global and multilateral issues. A European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has been set up since 2007 to provide expert advice to EU institutions and Member States as well as to collect and analyse data relating to the protection of fundamental rights of people living in the EU. And of course, there is the European “Médiateur” which, since its establishment, is carrying out its functions following an approach that is explicitly human rights-oriented.

Moreover, the consolidated practice of “social dialogue” has been complemented by the so-called “civil dialogue”, with the aim to involve in the EU policy making procedures, in a larger and more substantive way, civil society organisations. In this context, a specialized “human rights network” is developing⁸.

There are suitable grounds for revising the present “EU citizenship”.

As it is explicitly stated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Part Two (“Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union”, Articles 20-25), belonging to a EU member state constitutes the pre-requisite of the EU Citizenship. This means that “nationality” still remains the primary requirement.

In the present EU legal system, provisions regarding citizenship give way to paradoxes consequence of contradictions in the text of the treaties, where there is no human rights foundation of the EU Citizenship, as well as in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which, on one side, proclaims in its Preamble that the Union «places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union» (here the reference would be to the “human being”), while its Title V on “Citizenship” refers to “EU citizen” as holder only of some specific rights, and not the fundamental rights that are the label of the Charter itself.

What comments? The less we can say is that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legitimates to wonder why the EU citizenship is not based on human rights as is any national democratic citizenship. Such logical, natural foundation, while in principle not incompatible with the parameter of complementarity of national and European citizenship, would allow the latter to become physio-

⁸ H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2003 Yearbook*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; J. Greenwood, “Review Article: Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union”, in *British Journal of Political Science*, No. 2, 2007, pp. 333-357; M. Mascia, *Participatory Democracy for Global Governance. Civil Society Organisations in the European Union*, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012.

logical and consistent with the international law of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination, a well-known principle of *ius cogens* according to customary law. Furthermore the principle of interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights should make sense also in the EU legal system. This implies that the specific-special rights that mark the EU citizenship (in particular, freedom of movement, franchise and eligibility at the municipal level, right of petition, and diplomatic protection abroad) cannot be separated from the comprehensive set of all other fundamental rights – civil, political, economic, social, and cultural –, that is from their natural womb. No doubt the specific rights of the EU citizenship are justiciable in a concrete way, but this argument should not give way to discrimination between those who are citizens of a EU member state and those who regularly live in the EU territorial space without that «privilege». I think that advocating a correct and consistent foundation of EU citizenship with reference to the universal paradigm of “all human rights for all” cannot but become an important part of the active implementation of the present (though limited, privileged) European citizenship, a cause deserving great commitment⁹.

5. The spatial horizon of plural citizenship

The practice of plural citizenship requires deep awareness of founding values as well as knowledge of legitimacy sources, operational roads, the methods and instruments. Educational work should aim at transmitting cognitive data (and many innovations can be conveyed), to help internalise values and motivate action. The approach cannot but be global, interdisciplinary, participatory and action-oriented as emphasized in particular by UNESCO, starting with

⁹ A. Papisca, “Cuius Europa, Eius Civitas: Towards a Uniform European Law on Citizenship”, in *Pace diritti umani – Peace Human Rights*, 1, 2013, pp. 7-16.

its Recommendation of 1974 on “Education for international understanding, cooperation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

Under educational perspective, due consideration should be given to the definition of the right to education, provided by Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966: «The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace».

In elucidating and transmitting values, it must be made clear that values are not a matter of contemplation, they have to be translated into objectives for action following the axio-practical approach that is proper of the human rights culture. Needless to underline that concrete protection of human rights means satisfying basic needs and that this entails, besides bills and court judgements, public policies and positive measures.

Relationship with the closest territory, I mean the local polity, is essential not only because people should have, in that site, concrete opportunities to exert their citizenship rights, but also because, as in particular regards the European dimension of citizenship, local and regional government institutions are formally asked to endow themselves to «create and strengthen the vertical connection between the European citizenship and the citizenship of regions and municipalities» (EU Committee of the Regions)¹⁰.

¹⁰ Committee of the Regions, Opinion 2000/C156/O3 on EU citizenship; *Idem*, Opinion 2015/C 140/07 on Local and regional authorities and the multilevel protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU.

In Europe, the branches of the tree of plural citizenship are the regional, municipal and provincial citizenships. Citizens' interest in European institutions and politics grows if they are provided with real opportunities and suitable channels for political participation. Following the EU Committee quoted above, «European citizenship represents to a large extent a prolongation of the citizenship of regions and municipalities», among other that part of the EU citizenship that refers to the right to vote and to be voted in the communal elections of the residence place.

For educational purposes, it should be underlined that since regions and municipalities are “territory” in the most genuine sense, but not “border”, they have an inner vocation to overcome borders and should offer ground to develop the same peaceful and inclusive identity towards the inside and the outside of their native jurisdictions: «European citizenship cannot and should not be assessed and developed without taking into account other types of citizenship. The success of European citizenship depends to a large extent on how much it will be incorporated into the present civil and political-democratic structures and on the measures by which it is promoted by regional and local administrations».¹¹ This opens the way to a strategic alliance between local authorities, civil society organisations and educational actors.

As already pointed out, the ongoing crisis of democracy, that some want to export even by bombing, is mainly due to the fact that issues relating to representative and participatory articulations of democracy continue to be addressed with sole reference to “space” of the nation-state despite a political reality in which huge and heavy decisions are taken outside and beyond that suffocating space. Since local government institutions are forced by their nature to deal directly with problems that belong to the political agenda of world order, local authorities are fully legitimated to claim and actually play a visible role in international affairs. Being closer than

¹¹ Committee of the Regions, Opinion 2000/C156/O3, cit.

other institutions to the vital needs of citizens, local government institutions cannot but be the protagonists of the game of subsidiarity. Because of the ongoing processes of globalisation and transnationalisation, to be effective the game should be played in the world space where multilateral institutions are the upper pole of subsidiarity. Then local polities have a crucial interest in strengthening and democratising the United Nations, the European Union and other legitimate international venues, the same goals that are also pursued by NGOs and transnational social movements of global civil society. Achieving a more adequate space in those institutions is a central goal of cities diplomacy, necessary for their institutional health as well as for the health of multilateral organisations¹².

¹² A transnational movement for the promotion of “city diplomacy” is developing. The steering organisation is the “United Cities and Local Government”, UCLG, non-governmental organisation with consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many national and transnational associations actively participate in the network, among others the “Italian Coordination of Local Authorities for Peace and Human Rights”. On 14 May 1999, the Advisory Committee of Local Authorities, UNACLA, was established at the United Nations with the primary task of strengthening the dialogue between central governments and local authorities on the implementation of the Habitat Agenda.

«City diplomacy is the tool of local governments and their associations in promoting social cohesion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction with the aim to create a stable environment in which the citizens can live together in peace, democracy and prosperity»: this is the definition provided by the “First World Conference on City Diplomacy, The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, organized by UCLG in the Peace Palace in The Hague from the 11th to the 13th of June, 2008. On the subject see A. Papisca, *International Law and Human Rights as a Legal Basis for the International Involvement of Local Governments*, in A. Bush, Ch. van der Valk, A. Sizoo, K. Tajbakhsh (eds), *City Diplomacy. The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, The Hague, VNG International, 2008; *Idem*, *Relevance of Human Rights in the Glocal Space of Politics: How to Enlarge Democratic Practice beyond State Boundaries and Build up a Peaceful World Order?* in K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, Ch. Timmerman, G. Ulrich (eds), *The Local Relevance of Human Rights*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Italy's case is worth mentioning since the statutes of thousands municipalities and provinces include the so-called "Peace human rights norm" that states: «The Municipality X (the Province X), in conformity with the Constitution principles that repudiate war as a means to resolve international disputes, and with the principles of international law of human rights, recognises peace as a fundamental right of the human being and of the peoples. To this purpose it is committed to take initiative and cooperate with civil society organisations, schools and universities». This interesting experience that, for its legal relevance, still remains unique in the world, has been going on in Italy since 1991-1992, when municipalities and provinces were allowed by a national bill to exert a larger extent of autonomy in drafting their new statutes. Several regions have also adopted regional bills «for the promotion of the culture of human rights, peace and development cooperation to carry on in cooperation with schools, universities and non-governmental organisations». A good example is provided by the Veneto Region which, in 1988, advanced municipalities and provinces by endorsing a formal bill with of innovative content¹³.

By the statutory norm "peace human rights", Italian municipalities and provinces formally pledge to comply with the principles of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, with Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that refers to a «social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised».

The very fact of taking over such a "global" responsibility fits in well with the inner nature of the local polity as "being territory, not border".

¹³ See M. Mascia, "The Peace Human Rights Link in the Statutes of Local Governments: The Pioneering Example of Italy", in *Pace diritti umani/Peace human Rights*, vol. X, n. 2-3, 2013, pp. 123-132; A. Papisca, *International Law and Human Rights as a Legal Basis for the International Involvement of Local Governments*, cit.

Rightly, we can speak of a “cities diplomacy” to include all concrete initiatives, especially public policies that contribute to the construction of internal and international peace, that is to good global governance. The growing political profile of this institutional commitment, besides its educational impact for active citizenship, is self-evident: local authorities become directly involved in promoting the effectiveness of the international legal instruments on human rights.

The first help to such undertaking should be provided at home, by pursuing the goals of the “inclusive city”, that is by offering to all those living in the city equal opportunities for the enjoyment of all human rights (civil, political, economic, social, cultural rights) as well as channels and means for political participation. The aim is to meet in a consistent way the requirements of “plural citizenship”¹⁴.

Faced with unsuccessful experience of cooperation development as monopolised by central governments, it is absolutely necessary to mobilise more human and material resources to carry out direct cooperation between cities. Since genuine cooperation is a substantial contribution to good global governance, the “political” profile of the so-called decentralised cooperation cannot but increase.

Furthermore it is useful to know that the network of the “cities for human rights” is developing in Europe following the “European Charter of Human Rights in the City”, endorsed in St. Denis in 2000. The aim of this virtuous undertaking is to foster the translation of the international legal instruments on human rights into the daily life of local polities (*les droits humains dans la rue; los derechos humanos en la calle*).

¹⁴ A. Papisca, “European Citizenship, Migration and Intercultural Dialogue: The EU Leading by Example”, in European Commission (ed.), *A Europe of Achievements in a Changing World. Visions of Leading Policymakers and Academics*, Brussels, European Commission, 2009; *Idem*, “Value Roots for Multi-level Governance and Intercultural Dialogue”, in L. Bekemans (ed.), *Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe. A Human Rights Approach*, Brussels, P.I.E Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 27-46.

To carry out tasks of comprehensive peace-building from below up to the United Nations, local authorities should be aware of the strength of “soft power”, and of the fact that in using this kind of power they will reinforce the European Union’s identity as global civil actor endowed with the same soft power¹⁵.

Relating to the European space, we should be aware that the practice of citizenship is asked to develop, as pointed out previously, in a context of continual institution-building processes, that is in a laboratory whose political institutions still have few and relatively feeble symbolic capacities of identification while summit or technocratic decision-taking still prevails on popular participation. It is then necessary to develop, as an element of identification and belonging, what I would call the sense of the “constituent behaviour”: in other words, the sense of shared responsibilities in constructing what is important and useful for all. To nurture this strategic tension it is also useful to keep active relations with regional and local government institutions that are playing new significant roles beyond their respective territories and beyond national borders in fields such as development cooperation, cultural exchanges, international solidarity, and humanitarian aid.

But the horizon for active plural citizenship is much larger than the European one, it is the world space of internationally recognised human rights, whose institutional focal points are the United Nations and its agencies. This space too is an evolutionary yard for institution-building, although more complex than those of the European polity laboratory. As regards in particular identification symbols, the UN ideals are still proving to be more appealing than that of the European Union, especially in the milieu of global civil society actors that are very sensitive to the political agenda and deal with the construction of a more just, peaceful, and democratic world order.

¹⁵ J.S. Nye jr., *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

How can the European yard be connected with the world order yard? In the interdependent and globalised world, in search of effective, transparent and solidaristic steering, the European Union is recognised world-wide as a model of positive peace-building and human development, despite its many critical aspects. As a “civil” actor in the international system, the EU has the incumbent and huge responsibility to be a democratic protagonist in the construction of a world order whose DNA is made up of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. Besides its original institutional architecture and the achievement of lasting peace among the European states and peoples, Europe can actually offer to the world the example of a rich and fertile basin of human resources provided by the myriad of civil society structures and local government institutions, indeed an immense living heritage that is deeply oriented in peace and human rights.

For those living in Europe, awareness of the EU positive peace-building task in the world system, while emphasizing the primary identity as universal citizens would contribute to shape the complementary identity as European citizens and to develop a genuine sense of belonging to the European polity.

For the educational undertaking, it is therefore necessary to transmit cognitive data on the world system of politics and economics, international legality, the United Nations system, issues of collective security and human development, ways and methods of democratising international institutions and politics, international criminal justice, and peace operations. Here again the approach cannot but be action-oriented, noting that also in this macro-space there are real opportunities for active citizenship roles, mainly by working with non-governmental organisations and social movements. “International Democracy” and “Economy with Justice” are increasingly mobilising civil society organisations and social movements.

6. *Conclusions: towards a transcend civic identity*

The topic of intercultural dialogue, placed in its natural global and transnational context is strictly linked with the topic of citizenship, that is with the democratic practice. Sharing the human rights paradigm as the same axio-legal roots, democracy (national and transnational), citizenship and intercultural dialogue are interlinked. There is also an instrumental function of that paradigm as a code of communication symbols, as a trans-cultural tool that facilitates moving from the potentially conflicting condition of multi-culturality to the dialogic stage of inter-culturality. But dialogue could still be limited to an exchange of information, a reciprocate exchange of images and stereotypes. This is certainly a pre-requisite but not enough to achieve the principal aim that is: the inclusion of all in the political community to benefit from equal fundamental rights. The right reply to the question «intercultural dialogue for what?» is: dialogue for working together, to imagine and put into practice common projects for good common goals¹⁶.

To be fructuous, dialogue among individuals and groups bearing different cultures should occur among equals; if not, the case will be another kind of interaction, for instance for deliberate homologations from one side or another. Equality in our case is the ontic equality of human beings as assumed and explicitly highlighted by the law and the orthodox doctrine of human rights. The “equals” are the original holders of the universal citizenship. The dialogue we are interested in is one that should be carried out in the context of

¹⁶ The approach action- and policy-oriented is transversal to the conferences organised by the European Commission in cooperation with the networks of the Jean Monnet Project and the European Community Studies Association, ECSA-World. Precious materials are provided by the volumes edited by the European Commission, Directorate General for Education and Culture: “Intercultural Dialogue/Dialogue intercultural” (conference held in Brussels, 20-21 March 2002); “Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures: Actors in the Dialogue/Dialogue des peuples et des cultures: les acteurs du dialogue” (conference held in Brussels, 24-25 May 2004).

daily life. If we start from the human rights paradigm, dialogue should be carried out more than on abstract principles – education should play a major role to help internalise values –, above all on how principles are translated into behaviour and policies, that is on what should be done together, as equal beings, in the same polity. As mentioned above, dialogue should be goal-oriented more than comparison-oriented. The strategic common goal is building up and developing the inclusive city as the result of the contributions of many cultures. The fertiliser of this democratic inclusion-building is once again the human rights paradigm.

Once more, we emphasize that the culture and strategy of inclusion has a direct relationship with both internal peace (social cohesion) and international peace. These are the two faces of the same coin: the inclusive city is the ground of a peaceful and a just world.

Before the advent of the international human rights law, citizenship was essentially characterised as being national, unilateral, *octroyée* by the state, and based on the *ius sanguinis* or on the *ius soli*, in a perspective of distinction-separation, in short *ad alios excludendos*.

Today, we are at an advanced phase of *plenitudo iuris*, the civilisation of rights, of full rights, whose principles postulate the *plenitudo civitatis*, the civilisation of full citizenship. Human dignity is the central value of *plenitudo iuris*, implying equal dignity among all members of the human family. Full citizenship is obtainable when it becomes institutionalised, departing from the internationally recognised juridical statute of the human being.

The “new” citizenship is modelled on such a statute that is therefore fundamentally universal, *ad omnes includendos*, and it is articulated in the plural, in the sense that the universal dimension does not cancel particular citizenships but rather opens towards the experience of a richer identity. The universal citizenship is not *octroyée* and particular citizenships (the branches of the tree) must be regulated according to the respect of universal citizenship (the trunk and roots of the tree).

This implies that the *ius humanitatis* parameter prevails on the traditional parameters of the *ius soli* and of the *ius sanguinis*, making them complementary compared to the former, and functional for the harmonious exercise of identities. Even for the identity of individuals with universal citizenship, the expression “united in diversity” applies: in this case, “unity” means the ontic identity of the “human being”, which is enriched and develops in different cultural and institutional contexts. Universal citizenship sums up and harmonises anagraphic citizenships, and the inclusive city is a place that favours this process, thus plural citizenship and the inclusive city postulate each other.

In the inclusive city, particularly through intercultural dialogue, evolutionary dynamics of the identity/ies develops in a direction of a «transcend civic identity», a superior identity that is authentically secular because it is universalist, trans- and meta-territorial, and trans-cultural. This transcend civic identity is the *plenitudo iuris* that is interiorised by individuals, an identity that is open to sharing responsibilities in the inclusive city, in the inclusive European Union, and in the inclusive United Nations.

New citizenship in tandem with the impact of the necessary intercultural dialogue aimed at democratic inclusion can revitalise the public sphere in a perspective of multi-level and supra-national governance. Thus this kind of political architecture is congruous with the need to guarantee universal citizenship rights in the enlarged space that belongs to it. And it is in fact the “phenomenology in the plural” of citizenship, dialogue and inclusion that obliges institutions to redefine themselves according to *telos*, and therefore to open up and develop multiple channels of representation and democratic participation.

In the light of citizens’ civic identity, Europe is urged “to transcend” the negative part of its historical “Western world” identity, that is of hegemonic power, of “conquest”, colonialism, world wars. To “transcend” for Europe means to redefine itself on the basis of the positive part of its historical identity, as a basin of minds reflect-

ing on the meaning of universal, a European polity that promotes itself before the world as an inclusive space within its borders and as an actor of inclusion on a world scale.

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Global Citizenship: How to Approach Identity Issues from an Intercultural Point of View

Luigi Moccia

Abstract

The idea of “global citizenship” is not new, but new and challenging are the conditions featuring today’s world in which this idea has come again to the fore. Indeed, nation-state citizenship no-longer exhausts the political, legal and social relevance of citizenship, in the face of phenomena such as the development of trade and financial markets, information and communication revolutionary technologies, massive (diasporic) migration flows, in addition to threats and risks for human security all around our globalised world.

Starting with the awareness of the complexity of these phenomena, the essay focuses on the idea and ideal of global citizenship, looking at it as a long standing idea, but remaining quite controversial and contested as ever. Some various notions are highlighted, from past to present times, of what can be called a cosmopolitan idea of citizenship, by exploring the main aspects characterising its revival in today’s world, and pointing to a methodological approach which implies and requires a paradigm shift in the understanding of what means to be “global”.

This brings about the issue of cultural diversity as the counter-value of the ongoing globalization process. Indeed, globalisation has pushed forward cross-country flows of ideas, knowledge, people, as well as products and services. However, behind an apparent trend to homogenisation of world, counter-effects have also been put into motion, which lead, not without tension and even conflict, to the emergence of new dynamics regarding cultural and ethical values, social norms and lifestyles that affect individual and group identities. Increased mobility coupled in particular with migration flows have brought others very close to us. These “others” no longer live in

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some distant place, but right in our own town or neighborhood. It arises from here the challenge of the cultural diversity, within our ever more multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural societies.

In order to deal with this challenge, European experience may offer some good examples on how to manage diversity as a socio-cultural asset that affects both citizenship and education in a double way: a) the education through citizenship, enhancing the socio-educational value of citizenship as daily practice of living together in community; b) the citizenship through education, enhancing the socio-educational value of the intercultural dialogue at the base of an inclusive social dimension of citizenry.

Ultimately, a new concept and practice of citizenship is thus emerging, that goes beyond the closed and exclusionary scheme of citizenship classically understood in terms of nationality (nation-state membership), carrying out the meaning of “global citizenship” as paradigmatic feature of an open and inclusive society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail, in the interest of peace and security.

1. A premise to start

I wish to start with a little poem (of mine), which sounds like a doggerel:

*Black and white the world ever follows its track
White and black the world never goes back
Global and local the world is always total !*

It would, in fact, be like a memory exercise to reflect on three scenarios, each of which evokes difficulties and, at the same time, the possibility of overcoming them. In a word, three main challenges that we have to deal with in today's world.

These challenges can be summarized as follows.

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One. The world has changed dramatically since the last decade of past century, getting increasingly connected as fragmented, composite as unequal, uniform as conflictual, creating both positive and negative effects with consequent contradictions and uncertainties. Such context, where globalisation is not the end of history, shows instead the need for finding out a way through, that is in between a world from the past and one in the present, namely a midway which is also a way ahead.

Two. This way ahead to be truly such should look forward in the direction of going beyond globalisation, because globalisation in itself is part of the problem, not of the solution.

Three. The way through goes in between past and present: not so much by succession, as when the new day comes and we clearly see its lights because the shadows of the night have faded away; but much more by implication, as a “no-longer/not-yet” situation. In an embryonic and evolutionary state of things that is expected to evolve under appropriate circumstances towards a certain direction rather than remain in an uncertain transition. Therefore this way is not linear, but circular or bidirectional; that is it moves around and does not go directly, in order to achieve its destiny, whatever it might be.

Having in mind this suggestion, properly understood as a reflective attitude, rather than a theoretical approach of any sort, to the issue of connectivity, complexity and conflictuality (of both real or potential conflict) in our contemporary societies worldwide, we can try to afford this very serious matter, starting with some light curiosities, so to say.

A first one. Did you know that there is an International Registry of World Citizens where you may apply and get the Identity Card of World Citizen!?

Out there in the web, somebody advertises the setting up of this Registry, whose main functions are (as stated in the website page¹):

¹ <http://www.recim.org/cdm/registry.htm>.

- the Registration of persons as World Citizens and issuance of Identity Cards of World Citizens;
- the Registration of territories as "World Citizens Territories";
- the Entertainment of the Council of World Citizens Territories;
- the setting global electoral rolls (in connection with the People's Congress).

The Registry of World Citizens is the only organization in the world authorized to distribute identity cards of World Citizens directly to individuals or through its accredited "centers"; and, as a "world civil registration service", is working to establish the "global electorate".

A second curiosity, may be, of a greater socio-cultural interest is from BBC news. According to a BBC World Service poll (such as reported by Naomi Grimley, 2016): *"People are increasingly identifying themselves as global rather than national citizens"*.

The relevant data are quite impressive. Pollsters GlobeScan questioned more than 20,000 people in 18 countries to ascertain that this trend is particularly marked in "emerging economies", where people see themselves as outward looking and internationally minded. More than half of those asked (56%) in emerging economies saw themselves first and foremost as global citizens rather than national citizens. In Nigeria (73%), China (71%), Peru (70%) and India (67%) the phenomenon is more widespread.

By way of contrast, however, it must be added that the trend in the industrialized nations seems to be heading in the opposite direction. In these richer nations, the concept of global citizenship appears to have taken a serious hit after the financial crash of 2008. In Germany, for example, only 30% of respondents see themselves as global citizens.

How to interpret this seemingly paradoxical statistic datum, apart, of course, from the fears of richer populations of being submersed by flows of migrants?

One simple interpretation is that global citizenship is not just about numbers, in the sense that is not a matter only for polls and statistics.

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Its understanding requires some insights in various directions and at various levels, including manifold topics (history, philosophy, ethics, sociology, economics, politics, law), phenomena (such globalisation, of course, especially in the field of production and finance, regional integration processes, migration flows), new technologies and communication modes (ICT, social media), actors (international institutions and agencies, nongovernmental organisations, civil society), down to apparently minor, yet potentially highly influential factors (such as, to mention just one in the educational field, study abroad programmes or student mobility).

Within this multi-level and interdisciplinary context, global citizenship becomes relevant in a plurality of meanings, getting value much more as a cultural attitude and vision or else as a way of thinking, than as one single concept to be understood in itself.

In the light of this premise, the paper will be articulated in two parts.

The first one (§§ 2 to 4) will focus on the idea and ideal of *global* or *world citizenship*, looking at it as a long standing idea, very old and one that has recently come back into fashion, but remaining quite controversial and contested as ever. Some various notions will be highlighted, then pausing to consider the revival of such idea in more recent times, its relevance, together with its main drivers and dimensions, ending with an emphasis on the value of global or world citizenship as a conceptual framework useful to rethink identity issues in the face of the growing world challenge of cultural diversity (or “super-diversity” as it has been called with regard to the complex phenomenon of contemporary global migration), but also highlighting a methodological approach which implies and requires a paradigm shift in the understanding of what means to be “global”.

The second part (§§ 5 to 10), starting from the need posited by such challenge for a methodological paradigm shift, will focus on the cultural diversity management through education to inclusive citizenship as an example of (the need for a) redefinition of citizenship as a plural and pluralist concept, whose feasibility is being experi-

mented in the context of the post-national and multicultural era, regarding in particular Europe's efforts and policies to build «a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail» (as stated in the Treaty on the European Union, art. 2).

2. Global citizenship: some quotes and notes at random (from past to present times)

One of the most famous quotes concerns a Greek philosopher of the III c. BC, who is supposed to have said, when asked where he came from, *"I am a citizen of the world"* (Diogenes of Synope or the Cynic, ca. 404-323).

In short, this sentence marks the origins of what can be called a cosmopolitan idea of citizenship: global citizenship as substitute for or alternative to local (territorial) citizenship.

According to Diogenes philosophical and idealistic version, world citizenship can be understood as personal self-identification with the rest of humanity. World citizen therefore is who has a sense of belonging to the world community.

But another cosmopolitan version, less idealistic, yet with strong ethical implications, was conceptualized, again since ancient times, by a Roman philosopher, politician, lawyer and famous orator (Cicero, 106-43 BC).

According to Cicero ethical version, world citizenship (although not so named) existed alongside a series of differentiated group affiliations of more limited scope, starting with an inner group and going through larger groups.

The inner group is, originally speaking, the *gens*, corresponding to family (in a wider meaning); next comes the *civitas*, the city or local community as the place where we enjoy a complex set of economic, legal and political relationships with fellow citizens; up to the *natio* or people as national community of language, customs and

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ethnicity; finally stands the *humanitas* as the fellowship of all peoples with each other, the humankind, constituting the outer group founded on the possibility of universal communication between peoples resulting from and through *comitas gentium*: the “friendship” between peoples.

This more articulated version was thus based on a socio-ethical hierarchy of human relationships, whereby human beings are identified and identifiable first as family members, then as fellow-citizens, strictly speaking, further as members of the same nationality (tribe or language community), and finally just as members of the humankind.

With regard to this version, one may then observe that contrary to the cosmopolitan idea of global citizenship, where the membership to humankind comes first, the idea of different group affiliations puts first the local and national membership, but links it together with *humanitas*.

In modern times, however, thanks to the Enlightenment movement (XVIII c.) the original cosmopolitan version has prevailed.

A good example of replacing nationalism with a sort of “universal patriotism” in the name of the humankind comes from a forerunner of comparative legal and political studies, in such terms:

If I knew something that would serve my country but would harm mankind, I would never reveal it; for I am a citizen of humanity first and by necessity, and a citizen of France second, and only by accident (Charles de Montesquieu, 1689-1755).

This same attitude was echoed across the Atlantic by an American revolutionary in his appeal to human brotherhood:

The world is my country, all mankind are my brethren, and to do good is my religion (Thomas Paine, 1737-1809).

During the XX c., a critique of this revival of world citizenship, according to the philosophical spirit of an imaginary common home-

land of all mankind, was expressed in terms related to real politics as the only context in which the idea of citizenship, properly understood as membership of a territorial polity (local or national), has its true roots and meaning, being expression of the individual freedom; in line with a famous saying according to which is the air of the city that makes people free (*Stadtluft macht frei*).

In this respect, no one can realistically be a citizen of the world in the same way in which stands as citizen of his own country (state-nation); whereas philosophy may conceive of the earth as the homeland of mankind, is politics that deals with men, as nationals (citizens) of single states, and are the laws of such particular states that positively establish the fences which “protect, and limit the space in which freedom is not a concept, but a living, political reality” (as critically argued by Hannah Arendt in pointing out to the disconnect between human rights and the civil-political rights related with the belonging to an organized human community, skeptically commenting on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, because “no one seems able to define with any assurance what these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizens, really are”).

But coming to present times, it is noticeable a renewed relevance of the cosmopolitan idea of global citizenship, such as evidenced under many aspects.

In particular, a political as well as socio-cultural relevance of global citizenship stands out in the agenda of international organizations concerned with sustainable development and dialogue between cultures, regarding specifically the issue of cultural diversity.

Reference may be made to Unesco World Report, “Towards Knowledge Societies”, 2005:

New awareness of global risks such as climate warming or the erosion of cultural diversity, together with the advances made by the concept of sustainable development, point to the emergence of a global citizenship.

More recently, according to the resolution adopted on September 2015 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, Declaration, at n. 36), it is affirmed:

We pledge to foster intercultural understanding, tolerance, mutual respect and an ethic of global citizenship and shared responsibility. We acknowledge the natural and cultural diversity of the world and recognize that all cultures and civilizations can contribute to, and are crucial enablers of sustainable development.

And in the New Millennium Goals (under the section of “Sustainable Development Goals”, Goal 4, “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”, at n. 4.7), we read:

By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.

3. Global citizenship: its drivers and dimensions

At this point it is noteworthy that the idea of global citizenship has developed thanks to various drivers and across a variety of socio-political and cultural dimensions, such as (to list the main ones):

- international law of human rights (legal relevance);
- emerging global civil society (political relevance);
- everyday life (socio-economic relevance);

- education, from schools to universities (educational relevance).

To begin with this latter dimension, educational relevance, not surprisingly international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), activist movements and civil society organizations in general are promoting global citizenship as their mission, offering education courses to this purpose.

For instance, if one look at the Curriculum for Global Citizenship set up by Oxfam, it can be observed that *global citizenship education* (GCE) is beginning to supersede or overarch thematic fields such as multicultural education, peace education, human rights education, education for sustainable development and international education.

In the field of education it is worth also noticing how study abroad programmes at university level have been focused particularly on thematic issues connected to the idea of global citizenship.

But to complete the picture let's add some other notes on each of the other previously mentioned drivers/dimensions through which the idea of global citizenship it seems to take shape.

International Human Rights Law

Public discourse shows that a culture of global citizenship is emerging in connection with a culture of universal rights, as a culture characterized by a commonality in the recognition of the centrality of human rights as fundamental rights of the person (human being) regardless of and, however, beyond any state-membership.

The revolutionary character of the international recognition of human rights, directly based on the "inherent dignity" of all members of the human family, has deeply affected the traditional concept and practice of citizenship, so far known and exercised in the territorial dimension of single national countries.

For the first time in human history it has been recognized, instead, the existence, in theory as in practice, of an international legal order whose subjects are not only the sovereign states but also the individuals (*iure proprio*) as human beings who are endowed

with the same legal status of rights holders, basically founded on the dignity of the person.

Starting with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, art. 1: *“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”*. And continuing along a top-down process, so to say, with numerous later treaties, conventions and declarations, through which the signatory states have bound themselves to formally respect and protect human rights at national and international level.

This growing contemporary concern with human rights is to be seen as the product of political and cultural globalisation that emphasizes human rights over and above national citizenship rights, and formally assigns centrality to the individual person over and above nation-states.

A quantitative evidence of the steady progression in the recognition of such rights as a universal principle is given by the existence of 25 international agreements on human rights signed since 1926. Although this international human rights regime still depends largely on states, acting singly or together to make it effective, there are also now *ad hoc* world jurisdictions, such as the International Criminal Court, and independent bodies charged with bringing those who have violated human rights on a large scale to justice.

From the perspective of citizenship understood as a concept built upon the idea of ownership of rights, it has to be acknowledged that, while traditional citizenship grants legal rights on the basis of the individual belonging (by birth, *ius soli*, or ethnicity, *ius sanguinis*) to a particular nation-state, according to a discriminatory rationale aimed to exclude others, human rights imply the opposite universalist rationale aimed to “include all”. In other words, the idea at the basis of the universal citizenship envisaged by the international law of human rights is that people outside their home countries may become holders of rights directly linked to them because of the universal value of dignity; so that the coverage of citizenship applies

beyond territorial fences, wherever people in need of protection happen to land.

Therefore, human rights are the most universalized rights of the citizen and can be thus considered as the cornerstone of a global conception of citizenship.

This idea of rights that are not linked to national (territorial) citizenship is most notably true in the case of the rights of refugees. When refugees arrive at the borders of a state and makes a claim founded on the so-called principle of *non-refoulement* – i.e. a claim to be taken in rather than being sent back to a place where their life will be in danger – they are claiming this right as stateless or displaced people, but acting as individuals whose subjectivity is based on the universal value of the person's dignity: as a "citizen of nowhere" and, in this sense, as "citizen of the world". Although, legally speaking, the effect of such vindication will consist in the recognition of a status helping them to overcome their statelessness condition by favoring naturalization and socio-political integration in the host country.

An emerging global civil society

A second driver/dimension involving an idea of global citizenship is represented by the ever-expanding network of international groups and organizations trying to advance political objectives at global level. Bodies such as *Greenpeace*, *Amnesty International*, *Oxfam*, *Médecins sans frontières*, and still many others, are not created by states, neither they are extensions of national citizenship.

The phenomenon thus taking place sees the involvement of non-state actors (particularly INGOs) to put pressure on governments to be more sensitive to global concerns such as health, peace, environmental degradation, global warming, human safety, and to respond to them in coordinated ways, as an answer to new global problems cutting across national boundaries.

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These groups/movements are often recognized as elements of societal globalisation and the phenomenon as a whole is referred to as *Global Civil Society*, implying the idea of civic (political) engagement at global level.

Such movements and their global outreach in addition to promote the concept of dialogue among civilizations contribute to further enhancing the global citizenship ideal. When people join such international groups and organizations and take part in their activities, they feel they are acting as world citizens.

A new form of citizenship beyond the nation-state is thus taking shape.

Everyday life

A further dimension is that expressed by the metaphor of the “Planetary Vessel”: we are all in one and the same boat!

Global citizenship can be therefore understood and becomes culturally influential as matter of good civic/ethical (social) behavior; in order to try to avoid inflicting harm on others, either directly or by using more than one’s own fair share of global resources.

This idea relies implicitly on (a moral principle of) reciprocity, based on the assumption that other people are going to behave in the same way, so to join together the *us* and *their* (as human siblings) in a shared planetary destiny.

An example of this can be seen in the *Earth Charter* (2000), promoted by the Earth Charter Initiative (a global movement and network of people, organizations, and institutions, including Unesco) for its endorsement and recognition at international level.

The letter and spirit of the Charter are clearly inspired by a sense of universal responsibility at the base of global citizenship that embraces an overall of issues listed as Charter’s Principles under the following titles: “Respect and care for the community of life”; “Ecological integrity”; “Social and economic justice”; “Democracy, nonviolence, and peace”.

But quite interestingly, what characterizes such universality is the strict interaction between the global and local dimension, as it is evidenced in the Preamble of Charter, where it is stated:

We must decide to live with a sense of universal responsibility identifying ourselves with the whole Earth community as well as our local communities.

We are at once citizens of different nations and of one world in which the local and global are linked.

To sum up the whole argument thus far sketched, one may say that the most common definition of citizenship is still membership of a nation-state: the so-called “passport citizenship”.

Yet nation-state citizenship no-longer exhausts the political, legal and social relevance of citizenship in the globalised world.

Global citizenship is emerging at political, legal, social, and educational level, as a concept not-yet established in a definite form (commonly accepted definition), but nonetheless having an ever growing relevance, both in theory and in practice, especially in the case of human rights.

4. Global what?

In order to further develop the argument, it is appropriate at this point to focus briefly on the question about the meaning of what is *global*.

To this regard, one could observe, by recalling some points of the initial premise above (§ 1), that what is *global* is:

- *connected* (i.e., interconnected/transborder/sovrernational/cosmopolitan);
- *complex* (i.e., plural/multiple);
- *conflictual* (i.e., diverse/challenging/destabilizing).

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To the extent to which connectivity, complexity, and conflictuality (of both real or potential conflict) relate to each other, these basic features make up the *conceptual framework* of globalisation.

It should be also observed that a common aspect to these features is the extra-territorial or spatial dimension within which the strict relationship between connectivity, complexity and conflictuality give shape to globalisation.

In this sense, what is global is:

- constantly in tension between unity and diversity; and
- leading to two opposite, yet complementary scenarios, in a relationship of mutual implication between essence and accident, rule and exception, which can be synthesized, respectively, with a dual formula that works in a double way.

Unity (essence) *in Diversity* (accident), and *Diversity* (essence) *in Unity* (accident).

Whereby, as a result, what is global is:

- bidirectional, moving between unity (as uniformity) as a rule, if not as a target to be reached (at least for the sake of the global market), that means “one size fits all”; and diversity as a rule and ideal in itself that, on the contrary, means diversity as an essential necessity, both in nature as well as in culture.

Taking the direction of uniformity, the formula of “unity in diversity” is leading to a uniform world order: a *flat* world, or, to say it in other words, a world encapsulated *in a cage*, as regards lifestyles, linguistic codes, behavioral attitudes, and the like.

Indeed, globalisation has strongly accelerated in the last forty years the process of homogenisation that has brought about an ever greater uniformity of places, peoples, habits of life and traditions, thus reducing if not destroying local economic and social realities, along with their surrounding cultural diversity.

Therefore, the unity in diversity alone is not enough to balance the world vital biodiversity, without its complementary opposite represented by the formula of “diversity in unity”, leading instead to a multipolar world, in terms of a variety and plurality of power centers.

Then, what is global is (should be) properly understood in the *complementarity of its universal and local components* related to competing needs and interests, as:

- a *sustainable planetary diversity* between peoples and cultures.

This comprehensive global concern to reach *unity without uniformity*, and at the same time to preserve and value *diversity without fragmentation*, is (should) be a foundational goal to educate people to *global citizenship*, understood not as a status of membership to anywhere, but as *a cultural attitude locally rooted as well as a universal aspiration functionally aimed to peaceful coexistence*, and as such committed to:

- reflect on issues that matter seriously for the future of humanity and our planet;
- try to become more and more responsible as regards such issues (paradigm shift);
- think global and act local, and vice versa (think local and act global), in the sense and to the extent of the of *mutual implication* of the two terms, as explained just before.

5. Cultural diversity: policy approaches on how to integrate people and the idea of inclusive citizenship as socio-educational value

All of that said, it is time to concentrate on a more specific issue concerning the integration of people in the context of an ever-growing complexity and diversity of our societies.

This issue is becoming particularly acute in the European region because not only of migration flows of recent times, but also because of the more traditional policy approaches to the matter pursued in past times in some of the European countries much affected by the presence of community of people from abroad (especially from former colonial settlements).

With an eye on this European experience, it may be observed that more traditional and somewhat old policy approaches look to

cultural diversity as a problem to be solved. Thus, the so-called “assimilationist” approach aims to discourage diversity and to absorb it into the cultural majority of the host country. At the opposite, the so-called “multiculturalist” approach advocates the recognition of minority groups on par with the host majority, but in fact sharing a same, schematic conception of society in terms of contrast between majority and minority, differing only in endorsing separation of the minority from the majority, rather than assimilation to it.

In response to the deficiencies in both these approaches, a new type of so-called “intercultural” approach looks to diversity as a fact with positive potentialities to be managed for the benefit of better social cohesion and integration.

To this regard, the “intercultural cities programme” launched as a joint action by the Council of Europe and the European Commission provides a good example on how to manage diversity as a socio-cultural asset that affects both citizenship and education in a double way.

The *education through citizenship*, enhancing the socio-educational value of citizenship as daily practice of living together in community.

The *citizenship through education*, enhancing the socio-educational value of the intercultural dialogue at the base of an inclusive, more active and participatory, dimension of citizenry.

In this sense, the general and rather generic idea of global citizenship takes up the most feasible spirit and function of a means of coexistence through different cultures, in the form of the so-called “intercultural citizenship.”

Along this path of reasoning, focused on the mutual relationship between citizenship and education, in view of societies getting more and more complex and potentially conflictual, because of their plurality and diversity, we will try to argue that the idea of global citizenship thus based on intercultural education, instead of being expression of abstract universal principles, has its roots in local territories and communities, within the framework of shared values, across boundaries of any nature physical or mental ones that hinder the very es-

sence of education as one of the most fundamental human rights: that one to learn to be human.

6. The challenge of cultural diversity and the evolving concept of citizenship: an overview

Interdependence on a global scale is and will increasingly be the most widespread human condition on the planet.

In the contemporary world, cultures are no longer isolated. They interact and influence each other. One of the main reasons is, of course, the process of globalisation that has pushed the cross-country flows of ideas, knowledge, goods, capital and people.

Behind an apparent trend to homogenization of world cultures, that brings out new macro identities, such as the one of global consumers, counter-dynamics are set in motion that lead, not without tension, to the emergence of new dynamics regarding cultural and ethical values, social norms and lifestyles that affect individual and group identities.

Increased mobility coupled in particular with migration flows have brought others very close to us. These "others" no longer live in some distant place, but right in our own town or neighborhood. Such proximity, along with the mixing up of individuals and groups, has brought about a greater articulation and extension of diversity, no longer in terms only of movements of people reflecting more ethnicities, languages and countries of origin, but as regards a multiplication of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live, sometimes called "super-diversity".²

² When coining this term S. Vertovec ("The emergence of super-diversity in Britain", Research on immigration and integration in the metropolis, vol. No. 06-14, Working Paper Series, Vancouver Centre of Excellence; "Super-diversity and its implications", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2007, 30(6), pp. 1024ff.) used "super-diversity" to intend that "diversification not only applies to the range of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, but also to the socio-economic, cultural,

These phenomena pose the need for the overcoming, especially in the field of social sciences, of the Europe/West-centric paradigm, in its turn linked to ideologised and territorialised methodological nationalism.

With regard in particular to the European region, we are experiencing an ever-growing complexity in the context of societies at local and national level that become more and more pluralistic: multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural.

At this junction between global trends and the resulting diversification of social contexts at territorial (local) levels, it raises the question and the challenge of cultural diversity.

Generally understood as the outcome of complex and dynamic processes through which individuals and groups continuously categorise themselves and are categorised by others, with reference not only to ethno-linguistic but also to religion and other characteristics for the identification of groups in a population, cultural diversity presents both risks and benefits. The risks of discrimination, intolerance, racism, violence and conflict that threaten social cohesion are confronted with the idea of *diversity as a value* with beneficial opportunities to be developed out of the plurality of cultural backgrounds as source of exchange, innovation and creativity.

We may agree with the great French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss prediction that a *“world civilization could, in fact, represent no more than a worldwide coalition of cultures, each of which would preserve its own originality.”* But keeping in mind the basic ambivalence of the risks/benefits potentially arising out of the cultural diversity, the problem still remains: how could we then cope with this challenge?

religious, and linguistic profiles of the migrants as well as to their civil status, their educational or training background, and their migration trajectories, networks and diasporic links”: K. Arnaut & M. Spotti, “Super-diversity discourse”, Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies, Paper 90, January 2014, p. 2.

The 2001 Unesco “Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity” stresses the positive potential of the plurality of cultures, stating that “*cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature*” (Art. 1). Further, in the Preamble to the 2005 Unesco “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” is affirmed that cultural diversity is “*a defining characteristic of humanity... a common heritage to be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all.*”

The Council of Europe (a pan-European human rights and democracy watchdog), states clearly that diversity is a resource necessary for the advancement of societies, and that the expression of one’s cultural identity is a fundamental right. It has enshrined these principles in various international conventions and other legal instruments. European societies need to embrace and harness diversity in order to foster a pluralistic identity at the basis of a European model of open and inclusive society, if it is to avoid increasing conflicts, violence and exclusion which will tarnish its own core values.

However, besides general principles, critical views on diversity look to it as factor that can hinder social empathy. Diversity can have negative effects due to difficult interactions (communication barriers) between different cultures, incompatible behaviours, lack of shared values and norms. Diversity may generate fear of losing national identity at the root of the classic notion of citizenship and thus provoke reactions against “foreigners”, such as reciprocal distaste and conflicting attitudes. Social conflicts may arise when immigrants are seen as competitors for housing, jobs and social benefits.

But, on the other side, the same picture shows that in today’s societies, becoming more and more *multiple*, i.e. culturally diverse, the concept of citizenship understood as belonging to the state no longer implies a single people. In the globalised world the correspondence of citizenship with national identity, fenced within the territorial as well as cultural borders of the nation-state, is evolving from the more traditional exclusionary model, based on the dichotomy

between “we” (citizens) and the “others” (foreigners), towards a new logic of higher standards of inclusiveness and social cohesion in the name of principles and values such as solidarity, non-discrimination and peaceful coexistence.

7. Differing national policies and the need for a change of logic: intercultural encounters on the road to cosmopolitanism

In order to cope with such issues European countries, individually taken, have developed over time various and different policies of diversity management. As above anticipated, two main approaches may be distinguished.

The assimilationist approach aims to discourage diversity and to absorb it into the cultural majority of the host country.

At the opposite, the multiculturalist approach advocates the recognition of minority groups on par with the host majority.

Our purpose here is not to evaluate these policies, but to see if there is, and what is, a new, emerging and possibly prevailing European view on the matter, and more precisely what are the implications with regard to the relationship between citizenship and education in a multicultural environment.

Before coming to this later on, it is here required to pause, briefly enough, to observe that, in spite of their outward differences, multiculturalism and assimilationism share a same conception of society, in terms of contrast between majority and minority, differing only in endorsing separation of the minority from the majority, rather than assimilation to it.

To take further the point, it is interesting to note the dichotomous nature of such conception, which reveals an underlying logic that, for the sake of simplicity, I would refer to as the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. This logic implies a point of view according to which any kind of identity, be it of an abstract concept, or an object existing in nature, arises from itself and is valid in it

itself, in contrast with any other identity equally understood as such, on its turn.

Contrary to such more traditional approaches looking at diversity as a problem to be solved, a third-way, beyond assimilation and multiculturalism, is the intercultural one, which looks to diversity as a fact to be engaged with, in order to make it an asset for better answering the problem on how to build a more cohesive society, based on mutual exchange between the plurality of its cultural components.

In the light of the principle mentioned earlier on the equivalence of cultural diversity with biodiversity, this new approach carries out the idea of encouraging public policies able to address positively the challenge of diversity as a fact with potential benefits, that opens the way to the possibility of developing the intercultural society's vision, in terms of mutual exchange between the plurality of its cultural components.

This new approach seems to carry a strong similarity and proximity to a culture-specific characteristic, not typically European (Western), within the terms of the Aristotelian tradition, but of external origin, amenable to an Eastern and especially Chinese traditional way of thinking, expressed by the so-called "principle of contradiction" or "complementary nature of opposites." A concept also referred to as the "logic of correlative duality."

This change of logic, I do not dare to call it philosophy, for present purposes, makes interculturality a less ideologised and territorialised policy approach than the assimilationist and multiculturalist one, respectively, on the basis of the principled assumption of complementarity of (different) cultures.

In both methodological and conceptual terms, this way of thinking means:

- to carry out a dual logic, calibrated on the opportunity (if not the necessity) to get rid of the oppositional logic (*aut-aut*) and rely on a conciliatory one (*and-and*), that is to say the *inclusive distinction*;

- to support a harmonious or mimetic form of reasoning which tends to imitate, and not to dominate, the reality (nature) of things in its many manifestations, often contradictory;
- to accept reality of things, without however being resigned to the idea of an amalgam of unresolved contradictions, but as a possibility of a mixed blend of cultural identities characterizing a condition of multiple affiliations, that one of the *global citizen*.

Cosmopolitanism, therefore, as a characteristic trend of the contemporary world expresses and reflects such an inclusive logic of complementarity of opposites, rather than dichotomous logic of mutual exclusion.

8. *The mutual relationship between citizenship and education*

Bearing in mind that citizenship and education as complementary terms, at least in theory, can work together in a double way, as education through citizenship and as citizenship through education, I propose here to talk about two scenarios and related objectives, each exemplifying the one and the other way, respectively, in which the mutual relationship between citizenship and education becomes relevant in face of the diversity challenge set above.

The first example is a factual example, although limited here to a description of its main features, regarding the so-called “intercultural cities programme,” launched in 2008 as a joint action of the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

The second example is about the conceptual framework of this programme, here again limited to a description of its main features, regarding the *intercultural model* and, by implication, the idea of global citizenship, essentially seen as an educational achievement based on intercultural dialogue.

8.1. Education through Citizenship: the “Intercultural City”

From a policy perspective, the challenge is to design and implement strategies for the management of diversity that can help tapping the potential benefits of diversity while minimising its risks.

The need for new policy approaches, that respect and value the positive potential of differences while allowing people to build relations over and above and through differences, is at the basis of the most recent intercultural model, according to which minorities’ rights to their differences are recognised by law and institutions, but in addition to and with the support of policies and practices, on the side especially of local communities and civil society by and large, intended to favouring (formal and informal) encounters and mobilising citizens on issues of common interests that cut across ethnic and social boundaries, while setting out conditions to create common ground for mutual understanding and shared aspirations.

In other words, and basically speaking, minorities are not only recognized, but also supported with public policies, intended to favouring inclusion at local level on issues of common interests, that cut across ethnic and social boundaries, while setting out conditions to create common ground for mutual understanding and shared aspirations.

To this regard, the Council of Europe and European Commission joint programme on intercultural cities provides a good indication of a new policy approach.

First launched, in 2008, as 2-year pilot project, with 11 cities from several European countries, including EU member states and non-members, after the end of the pilot phase, a further group of cities up to 21 joined the network, further extending associate membership to cities in North America and East Asia.³

³ As reported by the Council of Europe (“The Outcomes and Impact of the Intercultural Cities Programme 2008-2013,” at http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/cities/ICCOutcomes_en.pdf), the programme: «was launched in Liverpool in May 2008 with a 2-year pilot project. The original member cities were Berlin Neukölln (Germany), Izhevsk

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The programme is officially presented in such terms:

The Intercultural City does not simply “cope” with diversity but uses it as a source of dynamism, innovation, creativity and growth. It accepts diversity as a norm and helps people from all groups – minority as well as the majority – benefit from it. The intercultural city shapes its educational, social, housing, employment, cultural and related policies, and its public spaces, in ways which enable people from different cultural backgrounds to mix, exchange and interact for mutual benefit. (...) The intercultural city does not avoid cultural conflict but accepts it and develops ways of dealing with it.

The intercultural cities approach thus proposes a new model that, at the level of cities, seeks to overcome the limitations and weaknesses of both assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches, respectively.

To this regard, it should be also reminded that both the assimilationist approach, with its emphasis on unilateralism aimed to resist and oppose diversity, while channelling it into the majority culture of the host community, and the multiculturalist approach, with its counter-emphasis on multilateralism aimed to foster diversity, but leaving it separated and even segregated to the detriment of common values, are at odds with the mutuality principle established as the first of the “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy” in the EU (2004), which states that: *“Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.”*

(Russia), Lublin (Poland), Lyon (France), Melitopol (Ukraine), Neuchâtel (Switzerland), Patras (Greece), Reggio Emilia (Italy) and Subotica (Serbia). They were subsequently joined by Oslo (Norway) and Tilburg (Netherlands). At the end of the Pilot phase in 2010 a further group of cities joined the network, comprising Botkyrka (Sweden), Copenhagen (Denmark), Dublin (Ireland), Geneva (Switzerland), Limassol (Cyprus), Lisbon (Portugal), London Lewisham (UK), Pécs (Hungary), and San Sebastian (Spain). It has subsequently extended associate membership to cities in North America and East Asia.»

In turn, this vision brings about the possibility to look afresh to concepts like citizenship and education, through intercultural lens, for a re-conceptualization of such socio-cultural constructs to better adapt them to the challenge of diversity, while exploiting, also through intra-cultural exchanges, the potential diversity benefits for a more structured peaceful coexistence.

To proceed further, here is a shortlist of main objectives of the programme:

- it promotes the active involvement of public institutions, business organisations, local NGOs and community associations in (intercultural) policy formation;
- it provides for the active empowerment of cities' diverse communities and help migrant to integrate in and contribute to the economic and social life of the city;
- it aims at promoting open spaces of interaction, which will help sustaining trust and social cohesion and facilitating the circulation of ideas and creativity;
- it acts across a variety of domains (education, public administration and governance, public service provision, housing, urban planning, security, sanitary services, health, education, business and labour market, conflict mediation, citizens' involvement, media relations, cultural and civil life).

These objectives have to be seen as functions of a series of basic assumptions that may be resumed, although schematically for the sake of brevity and simplicity, in the following 10 main points, related and consequent to one another.

1. Intercultural approach does not accept and freeze cultural diversity as an absolute, static value. Rather, it considers it as the means of cultural enrichment, as a driver for human development and human security, for social and territorial cohesion (the so-called "diversity advantage"). Beyond apologetic discourses on diversity, intercultural approach purports to embrace and harness the challenge of diversity in its complexity.

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2. Intercultural approach emphasises the strategic role played by cities, local communities and generally by civil society actors (such as educators, media, employers, trade unions, churches and religious groups), in order to bring about the necessary changes in public attitudes and create a public space more appropriate for including/integrating minority people.

3. Intercultural approach looks at the civic dimension as an inclusive space where to set out the conditions necessary for the concrete exercise of civic rights and duties by all those (autochthonous and immigrant) who live in it. This concept is exemplified by the “right to the city,” such as stated in the opening article of the “European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the Cities”:

The city is a collective space belonging to all who live in it. These have the right to conditions which allow their own political, social and ecological development but at the same time accepting a commitment to solidarity.

4. Inclusion means no forced integration (assimilation) nor, to its opposite, segregation into separated different cultural identities. But it is the necessary prerequisite for a process of voluntary integration.

5. The inclusive city respects therefore the multiple identities of persons and fosters the acquisition of a transcending civic identity, understood as a greater civic awareness needed to develop interculturality and solidarity projects and practices for pursuing goals of common good. To say it otherwise, the respect of multiple identities should be based on the development of a civic awareness related to the need of pursuing common goals of active involvement in a civic welfare.

6. The intercultural city is a community committed to educate all its residents in human rights, dialogue, solidarity, artistic creativity,

respect of nature and the environment. It is a laboratory for a new humanism, whose universal values are put into practice in the daily life of its citizens, benefiting from the contribution of all its different cultures.

7. The intercultural city is envisioned as a place for encounter and dialogue, in which new and “shared” cultural expressions are nurtured. In other words, a place where the development of a universal culture is fostered, which holds as its central tenet the principle that *“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”* (as stated in Preamble of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”).

8. Intercultural approach cannot function without a clear framework of values, and a rights-based approach to diversity management, including standards of democracy and respect for human rights. As stated by the Council of Europe, all actors engaged with the challenge of cultural diversity must have *“a strong understanding of the imperatives of a rights-based approach to diversity management, fight resolutely any form of discrimination and refuse cultural relativism.”*

9. Intercultural city is genuinely a *territory* but not a *boundary*. It contributes to the re-definition of the category of territoriality as well as of citizenship in that it mitigates the monopolistic use made of such terms by the states; and promotes, instead, forms of cross-border cooperation for the purpose of strengthening social cohesion. Accordingly, the traditional (hard) concept of citizenship as a political (exclusionary) instrument should be adapted to a more flexible (inclusive) residence-based concept. Its basic meaning should change from that one of being a citizen *of* a nation-state to that one of being a citizen *for* the wellbeing of society, and of the community (*civitas*) where we live in, with greater emphasis therefore on the value of citizenship as a cultural (educative) instrument.

10. Intercultural city is secular by definition: it is a space open to the exercise of all human rights by all persons, including the right to freedom of religion and worship. In the words of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the right to freedom of religion “*represents one of the foundations of a democratic society.*” The intercultural city, then, promotes positive secularism. Positive secularism does not call for the eradication and cancellation of cultural and religious symbols. There shall be no need to remove existing religious symbols, or other symbols of collective identity, from public places. According to the Council of Europe Recommendation of 2011 on “The religious dimension of intercultural dialogue”: “*differences that exist between people of different convictions (...) as long as they are compatible with respect for human rights and the principles that underpin democracy, not only have every right to exist but also help determine the essence of our plural societies.*”

One may worry, frankly speaking, about the difficulties in the implementation of such project and the effectiveness of its outcomes. Needless to add, this is a long-term project; it will take decades to get tangible results. But for our purposes, what matters here is the pivotal idea that comes out of the intercultural cities programme.

This idea consists not only in the *diversity advantage*, that is in cultural diversity as a positive value, but also and much more in the *citizenship advantage*, that is in citizenship as the fundamental condition through which to develop (an education to) the daily practice of living together in a pluralistic society.

Combined with this, is the idea that the more global is the challenge, the more local should be the approach to it. Indeed, any discourse on global citizenship or global education has its root locally.

When considering the concept of education through experience, besides and beyond school curricula, the intercultural city appears to be an example of *education to citizenship through the practice of citizenship* itself. Not according to the monolithic vertical nation-state conception of citizenship, but according to a broader multidimensional

mensional citizenship, such as transformed, reshaped and adapted to the changing context of our societies, characterised by outer globalisation, and by inner diversification of their multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural population.

In today's world, the idea of citizenship is split transversely in a plurality of membership to overlapping communities, ranging from the local to regional, from national to trans-national, up to global one, while coping with a variety of dimensions, such as the personal (private) dimension, of being committed to one's own ethic or faith, the social (public) dimension, of living together as equals in a pluralistic society, and the spatial (cultural) dimension, of sharing common interests in a context of diversity of habits, attitudes and identities. At the same time, however, by virtue of the international legal recognition of human rights, the idea of citizenship has become more uniform on the base of the value of human dignity. This internationally-based recognition of the human rights of any person assigns pre-eminence to a common idea of citizenship, which in turn implies that traditional forms of citizenship must fully comply with such universal value.

In this double sense, the re-conceptualization of citizenship, as normative paradigm of an open, inclusive and pluralistic society, takes shape in the intercultural city as a laboratory for a citizenship – both territorial (residential) and spatial (global) – essentially based on a *culture of the diversity in its universality*.

The intercultural cities project as a process of active adaptation to the changes in our contemporary societies aims therefore to develop a new idea of citizenship, rooted in local communities (residential citizenship), but with the fundamental objective of its transformation from status of belonging to *coexistence function*, in the perspective and to the effect of building a more cohesive society, precisely through the practice of citizenship as a universal value (and virtue), in turn expressed in shared values within local and national communities.

8.2. Citizenship through Education: the “Intercultural Dialogue”

Let us talk now of the other side of the same coin: the citizenship through education.

Along the path of reasoning so far followed, we come across the question: what kind of education do we need to develop that spirit and function (essence) of global citizenship that gives sense and shape to quality of citizens committed to the attainment of better, more inclusive and cohesive, societies now and in the future?

If we answer such question through the intercultural lens, we have to start first with an overview of the conceptual framework within which to place it.

The 2005 Unesco Convention’s definition on “interculturality” refers, in particular, to *“the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect.”*

Indeed, if interculturality – as applied to in the Intercultural cities programme – is a policy approach strictly related and intertwined with the intercultural dialogue, this in turn is its vital and strategic support.

To the extent that it points to *“generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue,”* interculturalism then goes beyond existing cultural differences as such, towards the pluralist transformation of public space, institutions and civic culture. Intercultural cities need to develop policies which prioritise actions whereby different cultures intersect, meet and influence each other, without offending and abusing or destroying each other. City governments should promote cross-fertilisation across all boundaries, as a source for cultural, social, civic and economic innovation.

All in all, intercultural dialogue is *learning how to live together*.

Two documents can be here reminded about the fundamental role that education plays in the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and shared common values, at the base of a pluralistic civic community identity.

One is the path breaking 1996 Report to Unesco ("Learning: The Treasure Within") written by the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, chaired by Jacques Delors, who in his Introduction to the Report (the paragraph titled "Learning throughout life: the heartbeat of society") underlies the Commission's position to put greater emphasis, out of the four pillars there proposed as the foundations of education (*Learning to know - to do - to live together - and to be*), precisely on the "Learning to live together," in terms of the need to develop "*an understanding of others*," and in order to create "*a new spirit which would induce people to implement common projects*" in order "*to manage the inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful way*," coming to the conclusion that, if this could sound as utopia, it is however "*a necessary Utopia*."

The other document, with an eye closer to a European pattern, is the 2008 Council of Europe "White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue", significantly titled, on the wave of that same utopia, "Living Together As Equals in Dignity".

What message can we get from it? To put it in the simplest way, three main propositions are relevant to building, in the context of a plurality of cultures, a civic awareness upon which to base an "*open society without discrimination (...) marked by the inclusion of all residents in full respect of their human rights*" (to use the opening words of that document).

First. The principle of equality in dignity finds its very meaning in the idea of a "*universal citizenship*" having at its centre the person, and embracing our common humanity and common destiny. In this respect, the important role that intercultural dialogue has to play is "*to prevent ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural divides*," and "*to deal with our different identities constructively and democratically on the basis of shared universal values*." In particular, interreligious dialogue should contribute to an increased understanding between different cultures.

Second. Social inclusion (or integration) must be understood as a two-sided process, consisting in the capacity of people to live together with full respect for one another, and to participate in social, cultural, economic and political life. In this sense, it is needed the practice of a democratic governance of cultural diversity.

Third. Such intercultural-based governance needs, in turn, to be guided and supported by a political culture valuing diversity. The cornerstones of this political culture are the common values of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. No dialogue can take place in the absence of respect for such universal values that are essential to ensure that will prevail the force of argument rather than the argument of force.

On the assumption that only dialogue may help to live in a complex society that aims to be characterised by unity in diversity, the question on what kind of education is better suited to afford the challenge of cultural diversity can be then reformulated in such terms: how to educate to intercultural dialogue?

9. Learning intercultural competences

We thus come to a final issue along the mutual relationship between citizenship and education in the context of the challenge posed by cultural diversity.

Briefly speaking, with an eye again to the 1996 Unesco Report mentioned above, a vision of the kind of education that would create and underlay the new spirit needed to cope with that challenge is implied in the emphasis there given, amongst various types of learning foundations, to the one about learning to live together.

To this regard, the basic proposition set forth by the Council of Europe is that:

The competences necessary for intercultural dialogue are not automatically acquired: they need to be learned, practised and

maintained throughout life. Public authorities, education professionals, civil-society organisations, religious communities, the media and all other providers of education – working in all institutional contexts and at all levels – can play a crucial role here in the pursuit of the aims and core values... and in furthering intercultural dialogue.

The key competences areas selected by the Council of Europe, such as civic education (mainly education to human rights and democracy), language (to facilitate intercultural conversations/ communications), and history (particularly addressed to develop respect for all kind of differences), are those most sensitive and conducive to attain basic knowledge and skills necessary to live in culturally diverse societies.

This short list of competences, all of them placed on the side of humanities, is not exhaustive, but it is open to be enlarged and adapted, according to local and/or specific contexts, with the addition of other areas of competences, ranging from scientific (such as in the field of health care and nutrition, without neglecting of course the issues relating to the earth's ecological systems) to artistic and creative ones, particularly useful to fight against stereotypes (such as in the field of media, communication and entertainment industry in general).

However, what should be here stressed is the common goal represented by the need to strengthen and implement dialogue between cultures, civilizations and religions, in order to expanding it, towards a more useful intellectual exchange, in the framework of shared values.

This has become more and more a fundamental issue in European societies; the one to embrace and harness diversity in order to foster a democratic governance of interculturality at the basis of a European model of open and inclusive society, if it is to avoid increasing conflicts, violence and exclusion which will tarnish its own core values.

The intercultural cities project, as an active adaption process to current world transformation, is a workshop, so to speak, for devel-

opment of an inclusive citizenship having its essential objective both in learning the real practice of citizenship as “civic service” (education through citizenship) and in teaching the educational value of citizenship as “civic virtue” in view and to the effect of building a society based on shared values (citizenship through education).

To this regard, next to and beyond the knowledge and competence, values and attitudes that make us feeling committed to use our skills positively for the well-being of our neighbours in our ever complex societies, are to be developed either through educational curricula and in a self-learning continuous process.

The kind of education that seems to be called in to play a crucial role for inclusive citizenship in the spirit and with the aim of supporting social coexistence across cultural borders, is education to such values and attitudes that embodies the spirit and function of “global citizenship” with more solid roots in local communities.

Indeed, the more universal are values, the more they need to be learnt, taught and respected in places close to us: our families, our schools, our cities. As said before, I repeat it here: any new idea of intercultural/global citizenship does not descend from above, that is from abstract general principles, but grows from below, having its roots in the community, in our way of living, in our sincere and positive attitudes towards the others, our neighbours.

10. A metaphor to end

It has been rightly questioned: *“How can we learn to live together in the global village if we cannot manage to live together in the communities to which we naturally belong – the nation, the region, the city, the village, the neighborhood?”* (J. Delors, “Introduction” to the 1996 Unesco Report).

Faced with this obviously provocative question, I wish to end my argument by going back to where it started; with a final remark that gets inspiration from the great metaphorical strength of that an-

cient anecdote quoted at the beginning of this paper: the one about the Greek philosopher Diogenes.

Millennia have elapsed since the time when happened that this man, who was once asked where he came from, replied, *"I am a citizen of the world."*

One may use this quote just to remind of the fact that since then humanity has started a long march, still to be accomplished towards global citizenship.

However, another and even more significant anecdote on the same philosopher recounts that he lit up a lamp in broad daylight going around, and when he was asked why he did so, he candidly replied, *"I am looking for a human!"*

Indeed, we have here a perfect metaphor of any discourse on education for global citizenship.

True as it is that both anecdotes of those ancient times had targeted utopian goals, it is also true that in order to have a possibility, if any, of coming closer to such goals in our times, we must face with the diversity challenge taking into account a further goal also of a rather utopian character; the one that points to a fruitful mutual relationship between citizenship and education, in the context of increasingly pluralistic societies within an ever more connected, complex and conflictual world.

To the extent that we need to have a prospective viewpoint of the variety of issues implicated by the idea of post-national citizenship, supported and nurtured by a real and effective intercultural spirit of promoting peace and peaceful integration within our societies, we also need not to stop *"looking for the human."*

We live in the era of the technological utopia. When Diogenes went out looking for a human, he had at his disposal only a lamp. Today we have smart phones easily available to millions of people all around the globe, and any sort of hi-tech devices (ICT).

Yet, connecting people in this way it is not enough! What is still needed is to get people *living together*.

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Notwithstanding such sophisticated devices that in few seconds make people reachable everywhere, we need above all a humanised common set of values and habits of mind upon which to base dialogue, peaceful interaction and prosperous coexistence in the world at global and local level, especially in the urban areas where it concentrates the majority of the world population.

As regards to morals, religious faiths, feelings and beliefs, cultural attitudes, people will be otherwise left alone in the darkness of ignorance, indifference and prejudice, without a lamp to light even in broad daylight, the lamp of education – the only one that puts us in a position to recognise our fellow human beings.

Nowadays that ancient message resonates like a motivational warning not to forget the very educational basis of any citizenship, essentially understood as a fundamental human attitude to sociality.

In this search, education and intercultural education particularly, with its emphasis on core values, empathic feelings, respect for diversity, mutual understanding, is the necessary utopia ahead of us.

With the words of the former Secretary General Ban ki-moon, when he urged in his appeal to world's leaders to *"put Education first,"* we must acknowledge that *"education is a fundamental right, essential for shaping the future we want."*

But it should be also added that, as one of the most fundamental human rights, education carries with it the right to integrate, participate and get involved in a multifaceted society where people are equals in dignity, and they respect each other on the basis of a true attitude to learn to be human, in order to become conscious members of local and national communities as global citizens aimed to preserve their own individual and group identity of any sort, by sharing values and enriching it with knowledge and skills that make them capable, precisely, to live together.

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A Values-driven Education for Intercultural Dialogue

Reflections on UNESCO's International Decade of the
Rapprochement of Cultures^{*}

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*“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use
to change the world” (Nelson Mandela)*

Abstract

Various economic, political, social, and cultural challenges in the era of globalisation have a drastic and diversified impact on societies, states, peoples, communities, and persons across the globe. Societies are growing in complexity, and there is increased interconnection between and within societies and communities, which lead to social tensions and conflicts. We are searching for sustainable conviviality in confusing times. In today's globalising world, societies no longer live in isolated territories or within closed boundaries. This is the result not only of increased migration flows, but of modern technologies that transform communication systems and rebuild relationships. Values-driven education is therefore of crucial importance to respond to the challenges of intercultural realities and consequently, to educate for true intercultural dialogue. The paper is structured in four sections. The first section introduces the conceptual content of a human-centric approach to

^{*} A first version of the article was presented at the first Expert Meeting on the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures which took (24-25 March 2015) organised by UNESCO in Paris.

education as to its value premises. The second section deals with the notion of culture as it is conceived by UNESCO and its impact on the Action Plan of the “International Decade of the Rapprochement of Cultures” (2013-2022)¹. The third section concerns the contextualisation of the notion of intercultural dialogue in the plural and interconnected world. The fourth and major section explores the role of education for intercultural realities in a globalising world. It starts with a diagnosis of the educational challenges in a globalising world. It is said that a values-driven education departs from the right to education, as guaranteed by Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The role of education is explained as a learning to live together in a plural and interconnected world. Some reflections are offered on the concept, objectives, trajectories, and practices of responsible citizenship education as well as of the need for intercultural citizenship education in globalising societies with regard to objectives and competences. In the conclusion, some guidelines are suggested to implement a values-driven education in globalised multicultural societies.

1. Values premises of a Human Civitas

Article I of the UNESCO’s Constitution (1945) conceives equal human dignity as one of the basic pillars of the democratic principles of justice, equality and (intellectual and moral) solidarity in order to be able to ensure that educated human beings are free and responsible, and to create the Human Civitas as a common humanity.

We are living in multi-faced and multi-dimensional societies exhibiting multiple characteristics. Therefore, it is important to identify, understand and translate the general principles for the globalised multicultural societies that often produce rapidly changing and paradoxical realities. They have an impact on identity, citizenship and soli-

¹ http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/decade_action_plan.pdf.

darity building, democratic cultures and intercultural dialogue. The transformation of societies also shapes education in its content, levels and format, consequently also citizenship education. Important therefore is to recall what we consider as the major conceptual characteristics of the “*Human Civitas*”.

- *Human Civitas as a Community of Destiny*: The increasing interdependence and complexity of interactions and relations shape our common destiny in a globalising world. In today’s confusing world we often experience a paradox between the rhetoric of the conceptual framework and the reality of facts and perceptions. The maintenance of peace, the conservation of the environment, and the means to enable people to live their lives with dignity all demand common policies. Unifying in diversity is the response to past suffering and the challenge of history. We are all called upon to work responsibly together to build a peaceful world order. The concrete realities of every day however illustrate a growing tension and differentiation among states, peoples, cultures, religion.

- *Human Civitas as a Community of Values*: Values are often rooted in common legal principles and enshrined in binding legal frameworks. Fundamental values are based on tolerance, humanity and fraternity, often further expressed in the recognition of fundamental and human rights and the rule of law. To underscore such a Community of values, reduce tension between and within societies and bring cultures closer together in culturally diverse societies require a dialogues’ framework, peace-building and non-conflict initiatives, reciprocal understanding and mutual learning processes. Consequently, they may stimulate a sense of common purpose and an awareness of a peaceful coexistence and reconciliation. Actual historical developments illustrate that the great currents of culture and art, the scientific discoveries and their application for the common good, as well as the critical analysis of accepted views and perceptions have created an area of exchange, interaction and conflict throughout the globe. Therefore, in the name of the preservation and sharing of the collective memory, intellectual, cultural and artis-

tic built and non-built heritage need to be cherished and protected in treaties, programmes and projects. This requires the free exchange of persons and ideas, and finds its expression in the common protection of values and respect for diversity.

- *Human Civitas as a Community of Life*: This implies the building of a tangible, living community. To that end, citizens should be given the opportunity to participate and contribute more fully in the community building within and beyond. The governance structures of culturally diverse democratic societies should be strengthened and individual decision-making procedures and policies made more transparent. All citizens should be informed of and be involved in the public debate. Therefore, the role of culture and education as cohesive and binding element for society building is vital. While drawing attention to common roots and values, as well as to difference and diversity, the aims must be to develop a spirit of tolerance, dialogue and mutual learning towards other people and cultures. This should be favoured at formal, informal and non-formal levels of learning.

- *Human Civitas as an Economic and Social Community*: The driving force behind integration and cooperation mechanisms has often been exclusively economic, though it has become clear that achievement in this field alone is insufficient for identity and citizenship building. Therefore, the social dimension of community building is an essential aspect of the Human Civitas and would lead – for reasons of internal and external solidarity – to sustainably cohesive societies. Multi-level governance structures, not only directed to economic, financial and environmental issues but also to social, educational, cultural and human rights issues are therefore central to a responsible Human Civitas in the present confusing times.

- *Human Civitas as a Community of Purpose and Responsibility*: In today's globalising and individualising world, international organisations carry a particular responsibility. They cover economic, political and cultural ties with many regions of the world, set in various co-operation agreements. It is only through cooperation, solidarity and

comprehension the emerging globalising system can effectively help to solve world problems. This global responsibility includes various dimensions. Apart from conducting trade and ecological negotiations with regions of the world in a fair and helpful manner, it also means responsible cooperation in conflict prevention, peace-building, upholding human rights, protection of minorities and mediation within the framework of international/external relations issues, development policy, education, culture, etc.

- *Human Civitas as a Community and Meeting Place of Multiple Identities*: Freedom, peace, dignity of mankind, equality and social justice are global common goods. To protect and further develop these aims, morally strong political structures are needed which strengthen the sense of common purpose through the building of meeting places and the recognition of the wealth of its multiple identities. In this perspective, the city dimension becomes more and more a space of recognition and expression of true citizenship building, democratic culture and intercultural dialogue. Reality shows how individuals are still bound to territorial places to define and contextualise their identity within the combined global-local aspects of globalisation. Cities have become laboratories of conviviality and living together with all the problems and opportunities multi-cultural societies offer.

- *Human Civitas as a Community of Multicultural Learning*: In order to build up life competences for democratic culture and intercultural dialogue a common framework is needed that takes into account the multi-layered and diversified institutional and culturally diverse international context. This however implies enough sharing to create a multicultural learning space which supports interaction and human integral development. Although conceptual, institutional and legal frameworks for education and learning exist, the operability, visibility and practical relevance are not always clear and the gap between and within societies remain.

2. Notion of Culture (and its impact on the Action Plan of the “International Decade of the Rapprochement of Cultures”)

Apart from the broad conceptual framework of a values-driven citizenship education a conceptual reminder of the contextualised notion of culture might be useful. UNESCO defined culture in its 1982 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies as the «whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group» including «not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs». These characteristics illustrate the multiplicity and wealth of cultures, cultural expressions and traditions. These diversified but shared cultural expressions finally make up the world’s social, cultural and human capital.

In line with the anthropological definition of culture proposed by the Mexican anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, culture is related to heritage, creativity and way of life². In policy terms it means we need to distinguish three aspects of culture in the globalising context: i) conservation: culture as an asset, tangible or intangible and a carrier of local identity; ii) production: culture as a commodity which needs to be re-produced not only to constitute cultural capital but also as a source of socio-economic development; and iii) valorisation: culture as a set of norms and capacities which enrich communities, a bridge builder and carrier of good relations for social and economic exchange. In summary, culture is in the first place a source of inspiration and cohesion for social integration and socio-economic development. It offers an intrinsic added value to societal development. Moreover, its multiplicity and diversity is a source of wealth and strength.

This revisited notion of culture has of course implications on the Action Plan of the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures. The dynamic and interactive process between the various

² R. Stavenhagen, “Cultural rights: a social science perspective”, in *Culture rights and wrongs*, Paris, UNESCO, 1998.

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aspects of culture implies not only a peaceful co-existence of different cultures within society but also a reciprocal influence and open dialogue between cultures. There are different approaches to define the way that different cultures relate to each other and manage cultural diversity. Important is to mutually benefit from intercultural encounters, while respecting each other's diversity. This internal and external cultural binding element can help to promote tolerance and understanding, prevent conflicts and enhance social cohesion. The first Expert Meeting on the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures took place from 24 to 25 March 2015 at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris.

In today's globalising world, societies no longer live in isolated territories, so their cultures are no longer the specificity of a given society limited by closed boundaries. We live in contact with each other, more or less intensively, and therefore other cultures are part of our daily life. This is the result not only of increased migration flows, but also of modern technologies which transform communication systems and rebuild relationships.

The current process of radical transformation of our societies require new approaches and new types of understanding and managing cultural diversity. Cultural differences are today often perceived as an obstacle and a threat to economic and social stability. The fundamental question then is how to simultaneously benefit from the opportunities and manage contradictions peacefully and humanly. Crucial therefore is the link with sustainable development, implying an alignment between the objectives of cultural diversity and that of social equity, environmental responsibility and economic viability. In the globalising context the notion of culture becomes the fourth pillar of sustainable development along with the social, economic and environmental dimensions, trespassing existing borders.

3. *Notion of Intercultural dialogue (and its impact on the Action Plan of the “International Decade of the Rapprochement of Cultures”)*

A third conceptual reminder to the contextualisation of the educational challenges in the plural and interconnected world relates to the notion of intercultural dialogue. This is firmly based on the respect for cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is an essential condition of human society. It is caused and fostered by many factors such as cross-border migration, minorities' claim to a distinct cultural identity, cultural effects of globalisation, the growing interdependence between and within countries, and the impact of information and communication media. Our cultural environment is changing quickly and becoming more and more diversified. More and more individuals are living in a “multi-cultural” normality, i.e. facing influences of different cultures in daily life, and having to manage own multiple cultural affiliations.

Cultural diversity is not only a fact and a right to be protected, but also an economic, social and political added value, which needs to be developed and adequately managed. Protection, promotion and maintenance of cultural diversity are factors of human development and a manifestation of human liberty. They are an essential requirement for sustainable development to the benefit of present and future generations. In summary, cultural diversity is a rich asset for individuals and societies, that needs careful and gentle management attention.

The increasing cultural diversity also brings about new social and political challenges. Cultural diversity often triggers fear and rejection. Negative reactions – from stereotyping, racism, xenophobia and intolerance to discrimination and violence – can threaten peace and the very fabric of local and national communities. International conflicts, the socio-economic vulnerability and marginalisation of entire groups, and widespread cultural ignorance – including the lack of

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knowledge of about one's own culture and heritage – provide fertile ground for rejection, social exclusion, extremist reactions and conflict.

This diversity is perceived as an essential dimension of intercultural dialogue for strengthening sustainable development, ensuring the effective exercise of universally recognised human rights and freedoms, and favouring social cohesion and democratic governance. Dialogue is therefore a vital tool for understanding and managing diversity. Within this context intercultural dialogue is defined as «an open and respectful exchange between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other's world perception.» It is meant to «learn to live in peace and constructively in a multicultural world and develop a sense of community and belonging»³ and can therefore also be a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and creation of social cohesion.

What is the impact of such a contextualised notion of intercultural dialogue? Its major challenge is that of combining social cohesion and cultural diversity through either an instrumentally integrative approach (i.e. the social cohesion approach aims at a more unified society with political stability, internal security, economic growth, and equal opportunities for all individuals and groups, regardless of their origin) or a cultural equity oriented approach (i.e. it focuses on the legal or political recognition of defined minority cultures and identities within a territorially defined area). Main policies are developed in the sectors of education, culture, youth and sport.

It also means that the term intercultural dialogue is strongly normative and seen as a pathway towards the goal of attaining ways of living together. However, a dialogue between peoples and cultures can also be constructive if it is based on common and moral values. In the current tension between (economic) globalisation, the need for internal and external solidarity, and respect for different cultures and religions, such a dialogue can be a vehicle for convivial-

³ Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. Living together as Equals in Dignity*, 2008.

ity in which cultures influence each other without destroying each other or to clashing with each other.

Crucial in this perspective is the role of education. The learning processes for intercultural dialogue, respect for religious diversity and civic education are based on integral human development. Places for educational and intercultural encounters are vital for practicing intercultural dialogue in, between and within culturally diverse societies.

Various recommendations, initiatives, actions and projects have been taken on by UNESCO since its creation, to promote intercultural practices within the broad view of culture, peace-building, human rights and sustainable development.⁴ The Action plan for the Decade of the Rapprochement for Cultures should therefore build further on the concepts, programmes, initiatives, declarations

⁴ The Declaration of the principles of international cultural cooperation (1966) clearly recognised mutual knowledge of cultures as a key to peace; The World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-1997) combined the specificity and universality of cultural values; the Report *"Our Creative Diversity"* by the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996) illustrates a clear shift from the purely instrumental role of culture to a more constructive, constitutive and creative role; In line with its conclusions, a thematic programme *"Mainstreaming Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in Education for Sustainable Development"* was established in 2007 as a contribution to the UNESCO Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014); UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) presents an important step in the institution-building of intercultural dialogue by recognizing cultural diversity as a *"common heritage of humanity"*, considering its safeguarding a concrete and ethical imperative, inseparable from the respect for human dignity and connecting human rights to intercultural dialogue; in 2005, UNESCO provided a new international framework for the governance and management of culture with the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; the UNESCO World Report on *"Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural dialogue"* (2009) elaborates on the importance of cultural diversity in different areas (languages, education, communication and creativity) for strengthening sustainable development, ensuring the effective exercising of universally recognised human rights and freedoms, and favoring social cohesion and democratic governance; the Programme for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence (2014) and its work on a conceptual and operational framework for intercultural competences.

and previous decades. The challenges are to operationalise, apply and implement the strengthened conceptual framework for the rapprochement of cultures into action within the rapidly changing international environment. This implies identifying and supporting initiatives ranging from small grass roots projects to broadly covered symbolic events in inter-institutional cooperation. Priority should therefore be given to the promotion of (inter)cultural encounters and intercultural learning at various levels which could bring culturally diverse societies closer together.

A thematic follow-up to the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (2014) was presented in the Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly on 26 september 2016.⁵

4. Education for globalised multicultural societies

Educational Challenges in a globalising world: diagnosis

Economic, political, social and cultural challenges in the age of globalisation have a drastic but diversified impact on societies, states, regions, peoples, communities and persons across the globe. The danger exists for a commodification and marketisation of education in its contents and outputs, neglecting the added human enhancement of the learning process. New, innovative and peoples-oriented (human-centric) approaches are needed to respond to the challenges of fragmented and disturbed societies also with a new culture for education and citizenship in respect of an integral human development, including various (formal, informal and non-formal) learning places and environments. A substantial and urgent need exists for a revisited role and increased responsibility of education in culturally diverse and complex societies. This diagnosis of the educational challenges in a globalising world implies a learning to cope with changes, uncertain-

⁵ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/407.

ties and risks. A focus on competences, practices, pedagogies, case stories, testimonies and exercises to stimulate creativity and fantasy is therefore required to bridge the educational gaps and change the mind-sets.

The Right to Education in a plural and interconnected world

Education is a fundamental human right and important for the exercise of other human rights. It promotes individual freedom and empowerment and yields important development benefits. The right to education has been universally recognised in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): «(1) Everyone has the right to education: Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.» (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.» This right has been further guaranteed and elaborated in subsequent international legal frameworks at several levels.

The Role of Education: a learning to live together

Education plays a central role in the development of both human beings and modern societies as it enhances social, cultural and economic development, active citizenship and ethical values. Education is to build peace, foster dialogue and enhance understanding in order «to build peace in the minds of men» as enshrined in UNESCO's Constitution (1945) and further developed in its various recommendations, declarations, resolutions and initiatives. To be educated is to learn and to be able to feel free of any kind of dependence, submission or fear. It is to be able to create, to think, to imagine, to dream – all distinctive and decisive capacities of the human condition. This ideal is summarised in the Delors Report, *“Education for*

21st Century. Learning: the Treasure Within" (1996)⁶. It focusses on the relationship between education and subject areas of development: science, citizenship, culture, social cohesion and work. It identifies the major objectives of education: to learn to know, learn to do, learn to be and learn to live together. This Report remains a basic resource in the contextualisation of education in society.

The current crisis of socialisation and value transmission has made the task of education difficult but vital for society building. The crucial role of education should therefore be reset within the dramatic acceleration in the speed of social change brought about by the process of globalisation. In such a changing context, we are being urged to rethink the meaning of education, as well as the uses and practices of teaching and learning, the opportunities for communicating interaction offered by new technologies and the dangers of commodification of human relations caused by the new relation between culture and economy.

Education should still be conceived as a dynamic process of learning, which creates added value and forms a person's integral development. It should transmit possibilities and opportunities with conviction, intuition and motivation. It is always a meeting with the other: hence the role of teachers as key agents for change and the need to accompany and respect their role in the educational landscape. This implies the need to transmit in an open and critical way ideals and principles that valorise the person at the centre of education systems.

Education's first task is to form (young) people into responsible citizens, and to provide them with information, knowledge, competences, skills and an open-minded behaviour, in line with fundamental values such as peace and tolerance of diversity. Its priority task today is to transmit knowledge and competences which scope and responsibility to the development of each person in times of change. Key competences refer to knowledge, skills and attitudes that serve per-

⁶ Delors Report, *Education for 21st Century. Learning: the Treasure Within*, Report to UNESCO, of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1996.

sonal fulfilment, social inclusion and active citizenship. These include the traditional competences but also the more transversal ones such as learning to learn, social and civic competences, cultural awareness and expressions.

Citizenship education in a plural and interconnected world

A further step relates education to citizenship-building in each society. Citizenship education implies to form (young) people within the specific socio-cultural context to be able to respond to the challenges of global interconnectedness and complexity, cultural disintegration, the dispersion and fragmentation of knowledge. However, it is not sufficient to affirm the principle of the centrality of the person in the education processes and transmission of knowledge. The educator and the teacher have to act within the socio-cultural context, responding to these challenges. This requires an integration of a diverse range of learning sources and levels as to formal, non-formal and informal learning.

If education has the priority task of transmitting knowledge and competences that give scope and responsibility to the development of each person, some fundamental questions need to be addressed concerning citizenship education. These relate to (i) education of and for all; (ii) education of humanity: this involves cross-cutting the dichotomy between a “humanistic” education and a “professional” education; (iii) education for change: this deals with the meaning of creativity and the use of a critical mind; (iv) education to master a variety of languages; and finally (v) permanent education in the search of values: this implies surpassing the so-called contradiction between tradition and innovation.

Responsible citizenship education

Furthermore, citizenship education should be based on a community of shared values. The notion of responsible citizenship includes an awareness and knowledge of rights and duties. It is closely related to civic values such as democracy and human rights, equality, partici-

pation, partnership, social cohesion, social justice as well as the knowledge and exercise of rights and responsibilities. This goes beyond the legal status and judicial relationship between citizen and state. A citizen is a person who coexists in a society. The concept is steadily broadening and changing, as lifestyles and patterns in our relations with others become more diversified. Far from being limited to the national context, the notion of harmonious coexistence among citizens relates to the concept of a community embracing all contexts – local, regional, national and international – in which individuals live.

The link between citizenship-building and education is very close and should be strengthened by various tools and initiatives. Several diversified learning modes should be promoted and developed that respond to the citizens' need for information, knowledge, capacity and quality, to deal with the societal developments of today's world. This is the core of the pedagogical approach to citizenship.

However, the teaching of citizenship is not sufficient; it is the learning of citizenship that is essential. This consists of the development of intercultural skills in context, by acquiring operating, social and communicative competences through practice, experience and dialogue in formal and non-formal instruction. As a consequence, the concept of citizenship could (and should) be integrated into the educational process in a very integrated way with a horizontal focus from different perspectives.

Moreover, active and responsible citizenship is a lifelong process. Learning citizenship is interactive and deeply embedded in specific formal, non-formal and informal contexts, implying a pedagogy of communion and a culture of service. Support should therefore also be given to citizenship learning within civil society as well as within the informal setting of the family. Teaching people to learn to become active citizens implies giving them access to the capacities and skills they need to participate efficiently in economic, political and social life. This also means the knowledge of languages.

While its aims and content may be highly diversified, key objectives of responsible citizenship education in today's complex world

should relate to (1) political and (multi) cultural literacy, (2) critical thinking and the development of certain attitudes and values and (3) active participation.

(1) The development of political and cultural literacy may involve: learning about social, political and civic institutions, as well as human rights; the study of the conditions under which people may live harmoniously together; teaching young people about national constitutions so that they are better prepared to exercise their rights and responsibilities; promoting the recognition of cultural and historical heritage; and promoting recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of society.

In this perspective, increased literacy should favour active communication and participation in democratic societies, finally leading to responsible citizenship building. Moreover, the impact of globalisation on our lives necessitates a growing awareness of the existence of different cultures, religions and political systems in order to develop respect for the otherness. In other words, increasing the diversity of peoples in globalising societies requires a re-conceptualisation of literacy towards a political and multicultural literacy, which might be a vehicle to mutual understanding and learning in multicultural societies and beyond. In summary, political and cultural literacy requires a life-long and a life-wide education.

(2) The development of critical thinking and the adoption of certain attitudes and values may entail: acquiring the skills needed to participate actively in public life; developing recognition of and respect for oneself and others with a view to achieving greater mutual understanding; acquiring social and moral responsibility, including self-confidence, and learning to behave responsibly towards others; strengthening a spirit of solidarity; the construction of values, with due regard for differing social perspectives and points of view; learning to listen and resolve conflicts peacefully; learning to contribute to a safe environment; and developing more effective strategies for fighting racism and xenophobia.

(3) Finally, the active participation of youngsters may be promoted by: enabling them to become more involved in the community at large (at international, national, local and school levels); offering them practical experience of democracy at school; developing their capacity to engage with each other; and encouraging pupils to develop project initiatives in conjunction with other organisations (such as community associations, public bodies and international organisations), as well as projects involving other communities.

In short, it should be clear that responsible citizenship education is not just concerned with imparting theoretical knowledge to enhance political and (multicultural) literacy in issues such as democracy, human rights, the functioning of political institutions, the cultural and historical heritage, etc. It is crucial for integral human development that positive civic attitudes and values are developed and active participation be promoted – be it at school level or in society at large.

Values-driven citizenship education in a plural and interconnected world

If responsible citizenship education aims at «empowering and stimulating people to contribute to social cohesion and cultural enrichment with respect for diversity and on the basis of equality»⁷ then the capacity for constructive conviviality in a multiform cultural, ecological and societal context, should be promoted by valorising the cultural dimension of responsible citizenship. This includes different dimensions of education as to reciprocity, complexity, verbal and non-verbal interpersonal communication, conflict-prevention, conviviality of differences, active participation and peace.

Learning and teaching intercultural (life)competences in a globalising world becomes crucial. Intercultural competences are becoming an integral part of what the Delors Report had termed as «learning to live together». Intercultural competences are abilities to effectively

⁷ Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. Living Together as Equals in Dignity*, 2008.

and appropriately interact in complex environments marked by growing diversity of peoples, cultures and lifestyles. It implies that the scope of intercultural competences goes beyond formal education and school learning. The UNESCO World Report “*Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue*”⁸ introduced the term of cultural literacy, i.e. a fundamental resource for benefitting from multiple learning places (from family and tradition to the media, and to informal groups and activities) and an indispensable tool for transcending clashes of ignorance. The Intersectoral Platform for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence of UNESCO provides a very useful conceptual and operational framework for addressing intercultural competences.⁹

Therefore, intercultural competences empower participating groups and individuals and enable them to interact with cultural others with a view to bridging differences, defusing conflicts and setting the foundations of peaceful conviviality. In this context, reference to Edgar Morin, the French sociologist, is essential. He proposes four objectives in the transmission of knowledge and the activities of teaching¹⁰: (i) to form a well-developed mind (better than a too full mind); (ii) to teach the human condition; (iii) to educate to live (learning does not mean only the acquisition of knowledge, techniques and productive modes, but also an interest in the relations with the other and with oneself); and (iv) to learn the dignity of the citizen.

Values-driven intercultural competences

Space and time compression render today’s world increasingly interconnected and interdependent in all disciplines of human activity on a global scale. The resulting new cultural geography has cre-

⁸ UNESCO World Report on Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural dialogue, 2009.

⁹ Intersectoral Platform for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence, Bureau for Strategic Planning, *Intercultural Competences. Conceptual and Operational Framework*, Paris: UNESCO, 2013, p. 44.

¹⁰ Morin, E., *Réforme de la pensée et éducation au XXI siècle*, in J. Bindé (ed.), *Les Clés du XXIe siècle*, Paris: UNESCO/Seuil, 2000, pp.271-275.

ated a new cultural landscape in which traditional cultural areas and old borders (cultural, linguistic, religious and others) are muddled thereby creating an unknown landscape with shifting lines and contrasting forms. Moreover, all cultures are internally heterogeneous, contested, dynamic and constantly evolving. In this new global context, peaceful coexistence does not mean living in a tight universal module, but fully sharing the richness of cultural diversity.

In such a world of increased contacts and far-reaching social networks, intercultural communication is more necessary than ever to understand one's culture as well as the culture of the other. However, the art of understanding and managing differences at several levels local, regional, national and international is quite difficult to put into practice.

Approaching cultural diversity requires that the broadest possible range of competences be identified and promoted. Hence the growing awareness that intercultural competences constitute a very relevant resource and becomes a requisite response to help individuals negotiate cultural boundaries throughout their personal encounters and experiences. The UNESCO and the Council of Europe have been addressing the growing interest in intercultural competences with proposing strategies, guidelines and handbooks in view of the realisation of true intercultural dialogue.

Living together peacefully by doing together as equals requires competence building.¹¹ This includes values (i.e. valuing other human beings, human dignity and human rights, valuing cultural differences, diversity otherness; valuing democracy, justice, fairness, equality and rule of law; valuing peace, peace-building/loving), attitudes (i.e. openness, tolerance, civic mindedness, responsibility, ...), skills (i.e. learning/critical skills, listening, empathy, flexibility, adaptability, etc.), and knowledge/ critical understanding (i.e. knowledge

¹¹ Barrett, M. Intercultural competence: a distinctive hallmark for interculturalism, in M. Barrett (ed.), *Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013.

and critical understanding of the self, of language and communication, of the world, of culture(s), of history, of economies, the environment and sustainability).

In other words, minimal requirements to attain intercultural competences include¹²: respect (i.e. «valuing of others»); self-awareness/identity (i.e. «understanding the lens through which we each view the world»); seeing from other perspectives/world views (i.e. «both how these perspectives are similar and different»); listening (i.e. «engaging in authentic intercultural dialogue»); adaptation (i.e. «being able to shift temporarily into another perspective»); relationship building (i.e. «forging lasting cross-cultural personal bonds»); and cultural humility (i.e. «combines respect with self-awareness»).

5. Conclusion

The International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures calls for a conceptual and operational framework that deals with diversity on a global scale. This requires a socio-cultural setting that combines globalisation with cultural assertivity and assumes a moral dimension that favours commonly shared values worldwide. It implies a combination of activities at various levels with different actors. First of all, it should prioritise a multi-level values-driven education framework in a plural and interconnected world. Following conceptual and operational guidelines should be taken into consideration.

Culture is a driving force for genuine intercultural dialogue

As such, intercultural dialogue is an important instrument in governance building, creating mutual understanding, trust and confi-

¹² Deardorff, D.K., *Promoting understanding and development of intercultural dialogue and peace: A comparative analysis and global perspective of regional studies on intercultural competence*. Report of the State of the Arts and Perspectives on Intercultural Competences and Skills, UNESCO, 2011.

dence. It is a vehicle for a more active, consensus building citizens' participation to create tolerance and respect between different cultures and peoples and to overcome ignorance, arrogance, fear and mistrust. Such a dialogue should be perceived as a path to conviviality and interculturalism in which cultures influence each other without destroying themselves or entering into clashes or conflicts. It is therefore a crucial path for peace and genuine sustainable development and may lead to a conversation among equals with respect for the difference and the diversity of the other.

A global responsibility favours a rapprochement/dialogue between diverse cultural discourses

In view of the process of globalisation and its consequences on cultural exchanges and cooperation worldwide, there is a moral responsibility to contribute to a strengthening of an intercultural dialogue among equals in a globalising world, while firmly supporting its commonly shared values at all possible policy levels. The maintenance and promotion of the global common good of economically, socially and culturally sustainable development worldwide, the common practice of mutual learning and the centrality of the individual citizen as a person are guiding principles in promoting globalisation with a human and cultural face.

A human rights paradigm is the basic point of departure for the rapprochement of cultures

Human rights are at the core of any suitable approach to intercultural dialogue and rapprochement of cultures. The international law of human rights has extended its constitutional space from inside the nation state to the entire world. The human rights paradigm is assumed as a powerful trans-cultural facilitator into moving from the (increasingly) conflicting stage of multi-culturality to the dialogic stage of inter-culturality.

A gradual but committed process from concepts and policies to practices

Sources of good practice projects are multi-fold. Successful intercultural dialogue projects are to be found in "shared spaces" of learning and solidarity, both institutional spaces and non-institutional ones. Moreover, a rapprochement of cultures can be fostered at all stages of cultural/artistic production, distribution and participation. Moreover, the educational challenges are to develop intercultural competences and skills among all members of society and to stimulate transnational cooperation activities. Intercultural competences should therefore be promoted to benefit from democratic culture and intercultural dialogue in culturally diverse societies at all levels. Finally, interactive communication processes will stimulate empowerment or development of self-confidence in individuals, and a sense of collective responsibility.

A number of guidelines of intercultural practices can be identified for sharing diversity within and between cultures on the basis of an inventory of what has already been done in various organisations: - recognise that intercultural dialogue depends upon the full implementation of human, civic, economic, social and cultural rights; - acknowledge intercultural dialogue at the heart of citizenship and integration strategies; - approach intercultural dialogue as a transversal issue which is part of a complex system of governance based on diversity, equality and participation; - develop strategies which view intercultural dialogue as a process of interactive communication within and between cultures and; - and open up institutional structures and international cooperation for intercultural dialogue.

In concrete terms, following suggestions should be introduced and implemented in the strategy of the Action Plan:

- to give ample applied consideration to the building of (inter)cultural competences for democratic culture and intercultural dialogue in culturally diverse democratic societies. This would require a

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rethinking and revisiting of the concept of citizenship in a global context;

- to strengthen multi-level and multi-actor governance in cross-cutting intercultural activities through increased inter-institutional co-operation between, across and beyond states, regions, peoples, civil societies, persons, disciplines;

- to valorise the role of (intercultural) education in various formal, informal and non-formal levels and practices of learning. Differentiating learning tools should be promoted in bridging theory with practice in concept, content and format. This could be done through cooperation and partnerships in capacity building and trespassing traditional boundaries. It is often through small scale joint actions and common projects (i.e. living together by doing together in intercultural realities) that an integral human development perspective of education favours active and responsible citizenship-building throughout the world;

- to mix and balance from the inception of the Action Plan applied reflections and committed trustworthy practices at all operational levels from the neighbourhood to the international level;

- to strengthen the link with institutions, civil society, academia through reinvigorating the network of UNESCO Chairs and Centres of Excellence by interconnecting initiatives and identifying the existence of and building on creative locally based good practices.¹³

In summary, the Action Plan of the Decade should favour a values-driven citizen education framework in which interculturality should become a practice of plural citizenship, favouring a rapprochement of cultures above a clash of ignorance.

¹³ The 2nd Academic Forum of UNESCO Chairs, organised with the framework of the 4th World Forum of Intercultural Dialogue In Baku (4/05/2017) was meant to assess their contribution to the rapprochement of cultures, to present ongoing research in the area of interreligious and intercultural dialogue and to develop an operational plan on their future contribution to the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures. (<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002515/251591E.pdf>).

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The EU's External Action "Dialogues": A Consistent Foreign Policy Strategy?

Marco Mascia and Pietro De Perini

Abstract

The European Union (EU) is an example of actor in dialogue within itself and worldwide. In the EU's frantic search of external political unity, dialogue, which the EU embeds in universal human values and in democratic principles, traces the relations with the "others". This essay aims to discuss the strengths, limits and interactions of EU's dialogues in the framework of its external action. In particular, it investigates whether and to what extent political dialogue, human rights dialogue and intercultural dialogue form part of a coherent foreign policy strategy in terms of both consistency with their value-paradigm of reference, and sharing of their objectives. This essay argues that, despite the constant efforts made by EU institutions over time to improve the scope of its dialogues and the participation of different types of actors therein, there is yet a substantial gap between the objectives formulated in EU documents and agreements and their application in dialogic practice. Moreover, although the three typologies of dialogue investigated share much in terms of objectives, actors and mechanisms, their level of integration and coordination within EU external action has significant room for improvement. In the era of planetary interdependence, of internationalisation of human rights, and of development of the global civil society, dialogues represent therefore a relevant instrument for the construction of a new international order based on human rights and democratic principles. The EU, however, needs to make a step further to integrate all these dialogues coherently and create the basis to enhance their effectiveness. To this end the essay suggests, inter alia, that the EU creates synergic partnerships in the various "dialogues", with better division of labour among the actors involved to improve the "dialogues governance",

and increases the transparency of these dialogues and their outcomes to favour the assessment of their impact.

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is an example of actor in dialogue within itself and worldwide. Dialogue is one of the main elements that have helped conceiving the EU as a “soft power” (Nye 2004; 2011). This concept has indeed been frequently used to identify Europe’s inclination toward employing different forms of cooperation, dialogue and persuasion with third partners with a view to attracting and co-opting them to the European model of human security, rather than trying to influence international events through military force and coercion (Telò 2006; Michalski 2005; Mascia 2011; Andreatta 2011; Nielsen 2013; Cardwell 2016). Although the international policy context, tools and priorities characterizing EU external action have changed significantly over time, *dialogue* remains a key-word of the EU. This is made evident by the recurrence of the term in the new Global Strategy that High Representative Mogherini advanced in 2016 to guide the EU “towards a Union that, among other things, has the strength to contribute to peace and security in our region and in the whole world” (High Representative 2016, 5).

In the EU’s frantic search of external political unity, dialogue, which the EU embeds in universal human values and in democratic principles, traces the relations with the “others”. The universalist value of this dialogic identity is in particular valorised by the content of art. 21.1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which sets forth the framework of values within which the Union’s external action is founded: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and

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indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law". It is precisely under a constitutional perspective of this nature, that Europe appears to the entire world as a political entity that "proposes" and does not "impose" values and principles, which strives to communicate with other cultures without imposing itself (Papisca 2003, 2006).

In EU external action, dialogue is both a means and an end, a value and an objective, a law and politics. This essay, in particular, refers to the current practice of relations between the European institutions, on one hand, and third countries, regional groups, international institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs), on the other, which is mainly advanced through Political dialogue, and within this broader framework, through human rights dialogue (HRD) and intercultural dialogue (ICD).

This essay aims to discuss the strengths, limits and interactions of these three dialogues in the framework of EU external action and to investigate whether and to what extent political dialogue, HRD and ICD form part of a coherent foreign policy strategy in terms of both consistency with their value-paradigm of reference, and sharing of their objectives.

This essay argues that, despite the constant efforts made by EU institutions over time to improve the scope of its dialogues and the participation of different types of actors therein, there is yet a substantial gap between the objectives formulated in EU documents and agreements and their application in dialogic practice. Moreover, although the three dialogues share much in terms of objectives, actors and mechanisms, their level of integration and coordination within EU external action has significant room for improvement. In the era of planetary interdependence, of internationalisation of human rights, and of development of the global civil society, dialogues represent therefore a relevant instrument for the construction of a new international order based on human rights and democratic

principles (Papisca 2011). The EU, however, needs to make a step further to integrate all these dialogues coherently and create the basis to enhance their effectiveness.

This essay starts from the construction of a typology, with reference to external EU dialogues, in order to identify the specific objectives of each type of dialogue. For each of these, the essay identifies the various actors and their type of involvement in the dialogic work, the objectives and some of the results achieved so far. The conclusions discuss the main findings and speculate on how the practices of dialogue in EU external action can be strengthened and transformed into a real coherent and integrated strategy.

2. *Objectives, Actors and Mechanisms of Political dialogue*

Political dialogue is a current expression in the community language as well as a commitment of both the EU and member states marked by formal agreements with third countries and regional groups (Council of the European Union 2014 and 2015). It contributes to define the identity of the European common foreign and security policy (CFSP), following the human security and human rights approach (see, among others, Mc Rae and Hubert 2001; Chen et al 2003; King and Murray 2001; Glasius, Kaldor 2006; Khaliq 2008; Benoit-Rohmer *et al.* 2009; Wetzel 2011; Kotzian *et al.* 2011; Cardwell 2016). Furthermore it has become a real style and method of bargaining, turning into a structural characteristic of the system of relations in which international threats to security are planetary, more diverse and interconnected, less visible and predictable, and affect in a direct way the European interests. Political dialogue is a process that has certain continuity and regularity as well as an "inclusive", "flexible" and "transparent" character in both to the contents and the participation.

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The objectives, mechanisms and actors of the political dialogue in the EU with reference to two third countries, China and Iran, and three regional groups – ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group), Mediterranean countries and the Rio Group - will be reviewed rapidly. With Latin America, the EU has developed a complex and articulate scheme of relations, as the so-called San José Dialogue between the EU and Central American countries (since 1984), the political dialogue between the EU and the Río Group (since 1990), the political dialogues with Mercosur (Mercado del Sur), SICA (Central American Integration System), and the Andean Community. The EU-Rio Group is a key forum for political dialogue and one of the main platforms through which EU-Latin American relations are enhanced. Today, it comprises all of Latin America as well as representatives from Caribbean countries.

The objectives of the political dialogue are formally specified in the agreements and political declarations that the EU signed with third countries and regional groups. The general objectives are to strengthen existing relations between the parties, to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, to establish agreed priorities and shared agendas, to facilitate consultations between the parties within multilateral institutions. Through dialogue, countries are committed to contribute to peace and security, to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts and to promote a stable and democratic political environment. The specific objectives are different on the basis of the country or of the regional group involved in the dialogue. Overall, the goal for the incoming years is to step up further political dialogue and cooperation on migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and terrorism (High Representative 2016, 37).

The EU-China political dialogue, formally established in 1994, has gradually broadened to cover issues ranging from the non-proliferation to the security situation in Asia, from global warming to the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. Since

its establishment, more than 20 sectorial dialogues have taken place among others on regional policy cooperation, intellectual property rights, trade and investment, industrial policy, environmental protection and climate change, labour and social affairs, development of agriculture and rural areas, energy and transport, financial, and information society. Since the mid-2000s, the EU has also incorporated issues on racism, xenophobia, migration and asylum questions in the political dialogues (Council of the European Union 2006; see also Holsag 2006).

The EU-Iran political dialogue, as a “Comprehensive Dialogue” on a broad range of issues in the economic, political and security fields, was established in 1998. It has covered global issues (terrorism, human rights and proliferation), regional issues (Iraq, Gulf, Central Asia, the Middle East Peace Process) and areas of cooperation (drugs, refugees, energy, trade and investment). In that respect, two high-level working groups were established respectively on energy and transport in 1999 and on trade and investment in 2000. Negotiations for an EC-Iran Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA), linked to negotiation on a Political Dialogue Agreement (PDA), were launched in Brussels, in December 2002. Because of the pending nuclear issues with Iran, negotiations have stalled for long since June 2003. A new high-level political dialogue between the EU and Iran have started in February 2016 with the goal of enhancing regular political consultation as well as sectorial dialogues in fields of common interest, including trade, energy, migration and human rights.

A varied and long-standing example of political dialogue is the one started in 1995, with the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration by the EU and a group of Mediterranean countries, which resulted in the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process. This Euro-Mediterranean political dialogue addressed several sectors including peace and security, free trade, civil society engagement, human rights and democracy, culture, education and cooperation in the fight against illegal migration,

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terrorism and organised crime (EMP 1995). With the failure of the Barcelona Process in the mid-2000s, political dialogue with Mediterranean countries was advanced through the bilateral action plans adopted in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is currently the main policy scheme for the relations between the EU and its southern partners (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, Cardwell 2011; Gstohl and Lannon 2015). Among the main current areas of investment for political dialogue with Mediterranean countries are democracy, human rights, gender equality and women's empowerment (European Commission and High Representative 2015, 6).

In article 8 of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, dialogue is finalised to develop cooperation strategies as well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, gender, migration and questions related to cultural heritage (ACP-EU Council of Ministers 2002 and 2003; European Commission 2016; see also Bradley 2003; Hurt 2003; Bissuyt *et al.* 2014). The dialogue agenda focuses on specific political issues such as arms trade, military expenditure, drugs and organised crime, and ethnic, religious or racial discrimination. It includes regular assessment of the developments on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance (European Commission 2016).

In the Political Declaration (EU-CELAC 2015a) and in the Brussels Declaration (EU-CELAC 2015b) adopted in Brussels, in 2015, at the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit, the specific objectives of the dialogue include: the strengthening of the multilateral system on the basis of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law; to reinforce the democratic institutions and the rule of law, and to protect human rights; the support to the International Criminal Court; the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in accordance with the UN Charter and fully respecting international law including human rights and humanitarian law; the consolidation of co-operation to combat the scourges of illicit drugs and related crimes, corruption and organised crime; the eradication of racism, racial discrimination,

xenophobia and related intolerance; the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women as well as the protection of children's well-being; the reinforcement of bi-regional political dialogue in international arenas and consultations in the UN system on the main questions of the international agenda.

A number of mechanisms have been created to ensure a regular and comprehensive flow of information between all bodies involved in political dialogue and to facilitate making joint decisions and conclusions in the spirit of partnership. The actors conduct political dialogue through contacts, information exchanges and consultations, especially the meetings of various institutions and the full use of diplomatic channels. Political dialogue is both formal and informal according to the need, and conducted within and outside the institutional framework, at the regional, sub-regional or national level. Civil society organizations (CSOs) through their representatives are not always involved in formal dialogue but the main actors are part of informal dialogue as forums, reports, international campaigns like the one against the death penalty, torture, freedom of expression, and releasing "the conscientious prisoners", etc.

In the EU-China dialogue regular series of meetings are structured at different levels: EU Foreign Ministers, Political Directors, Heads of Missions, Regional Directors, technical meetings of high officials. Annual EU - China summits at Heads of Government level, which were initiated in April 1998, in London, have contributed a great deal to improve dialogue by providing a strategic vision for the fast growing relations.

In the EU-Iran Dialogue, the Troika meetings were held every six months, seeing the co-operation between the European Commission and Iran through technical working groups and expert meetings on areas of mutual interest and concern (European Commission 2002). At present, the EU does not have any contractual relations and any significant financial co-operation with Iran, this factor is naturally limiting for the development of their co-operation.

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The dialogue mechanisms are described in the Joint Declaration on political dialogue between the EU and Mercosur adopted in Madrid by the EU and the Mercosur Party States on 15 December 1995: a) regular meetings between the Heads of State of the countries of Mercosur and the highest authorities of the European Union; b) an annual meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Mercosur and of the Member States of the EU; c) meetings of other Ministers responsible for matters of mutual interest; d) periodic meetings of senior officials from both Parties (Arana 2017).

In the ACP-EU Partnership (Cofelice 2014), the mechanisms and modalities of the political dialogue are more structured and complex. There are the relations between the EU and the Member States of the European Union, of the one part, and each ACP State of the other part, the joint institutions established by the Cotonou Agreement (the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly) and, of course, many working groups and experts meetings. There are the ACP-EU mechanism for the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), the ACP-EU Water Facility that provides a useful parallel and complementary mechanism to the EU Water Initiative, launched by the EU at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.

In a 2004 Resolution of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly especially devoted to political dialogue, some of the useful mechanisms that should be instituted as soon as possible are illustrated. For example an "ACP early-warning mechanism" as described in the "Framework and General Principles for intra-ACP Political Dialogue", to identify, at the earliest possible stage, any new or re-emerging crisis or conflict and help find solutions through political dialogue; a "Brussels-based Peer Group", in line with the guidelines of the intra-ACP political dialogue; a communication system according to which the joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers report to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly after ministerial meetings; measures to ensure the participation of women on both the ACP and the EU side in all forms and at all stages of political dialogue and the consultation

procedure; regular hearings in national parliaments on the ongoing substance of political dialogue; the systematic inclusion of updates on the political dialogue under art. 8 (content, procedures, organization and results) as a regular item on the agenda of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

Regarding the consultation and participatory mechanisms established by articles 96 (consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law) and 97 (Consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regards corruption) of the Cotonou Agreement, the Resolution stresses that it is very important to involve Members of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and non-state actors, as well as representatives of non-affected ACP regions, in order to provide effective support for political dialogue at all stages.

The mechanisms and the formalities of the political dialogue have assumed, with reference to the involved actors, a double dimension that is proper of the principle of subsidiarity. They are in fact developed along a vertical axis that involves the institutions at different levels of governance, from that local to that supranational, and horizontal, in the sense that, thanks to the action of the transnational actors of civil society, crosses the national, regional and continental frontiers to stretch and comprise a world-wide space.

It must also be underlined that the mechanisms of dialogue have multiplied and diversified with the enlargement of the political dialogue agenda giving way to mechanisms that are specifically devised around international issues such as maintaining peace and security, protecting human rights, assuring economic and commercial cooperation.

Also worth noting is the way the diffusion of political dialogue in relations of the EU, third countries and regional groups has activated, especially owing to CSOs initiative, a national, regional and joint parliamentary institution, and of local authorities, for an increasingly strong and legitimate demand for the establishment of effective

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mechanisms of consultation and participation. The theme, of extraordinary interest, is the democratization of political dialogue.

The principal actors of political dialogue are the states (local, regional and national institutions), the European institutions, the joint institutions if provided for by the partnership agreement, the non-state actors that include the private sector (economic and social partners, including trade union organizations) and the CSOs.

The Summit leaders have become a practice of dialogue. For instance, at the 18th EU-China Summit, in Beijing on 12-13 July 2016, the EU was represented by the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (The High Representative Federica Mogherini also participated), and the People's Republic of China by the Prime Minister. At the 8th EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit, in Brussels on 10-11 June 2015, there were Heads of State and Government of the European Union and of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission.

The presidencies of the Council of the EU and the Council have a driving role. The European Commission is fully involved in political dialogue, with a special role of promoting dialogue by financing of specific projects. The delegations of the European Union have a pivotal role – to act as centres of communication between the parties. The European Council, in its external action policy, is constantly involved in political dialogue, as for instance with the relations with African Union (European Council 2014), the United Nations (European Council 2016) and to fight terrorism (European Council 2005). Parliamentary institutions also have an active role. European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions on political dialogue (European Parliament 2010, 2015, 2016a). The main forum for political dialogue between the EP and parliamentarians from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly (ACP-EU Joint Assembly 2004; European Parliament 2016b). The equivalent organism for Euro-Mediterranean

relations is the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, established in 2004 (Cofelice 2016).

Civil society provides direct support and impetus to the EU political dialogue (Mascia 2012). In the EU-China political dialogue, for instance, the parties are committed to facilitate direct links between civil society groups in the EU, and China, in all areas, to include them in sectorial dialogues. Official links with non-governmental organizations have been strengthened and expanded over the years. Furthermore, European Parliament plays an important role and has developed a closed co-operation with the Chinese National People's Congress (European Commission 2006, 9).

The "Political dialogue and cooperation agreements", signed in Rome in December 2003, between EU and Latin America countries respectively and between the EU and the Andean Community, recognises the role and potential contribution that civil society provides in the cooperation process, and the necessity to promote effective dialogue with civil society. Article 43 is dedicated to the participation of civil society in the cooperation process. It should be consulted during the policy-making process at country level according to democratic principles; informed of and participate in consultations on development and cooperation strategies and sectorial policies, particularly in areas concerning them, including all stages of the development process; supported with financial resources, and capacity building support in critical areas; involved in the implementation of cooperation programmes in the areas that concern it.

CSOs have been also a major component of the political dialogue in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Within the Barcelona Process, the practice of general and sectorial civil forums, gathering of CSOs from both shores debating all relevant regional issues held in parallel to ministerial meetings, was observed as a major innovation (Jünemann 2003a). Following the collapse of the EMP in 2007 (and up to 2013), the participation of civil society in EU

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policy initiatives has been limited to the advancement of ICD, namely through the Anna Lindh Foundation Forums (see below). More recently, the European Commission has started a new Southern Mediterranean Civil Society Forum with a view to create a "mechanism for dialogue between civil society, governments and the EU and other donors" aimed at creating the necessary space, conditions, freedoms and trust between all sides (Füle 2013 and 2014). In recent years, the involvement of civil society in partnership agreements or sub regional relations (EU-Andean Community, EU-Mercosur, EU-Central America) and country relations (EU-Mexico and EU-Chile), has been very positive. Representatives of numerous networks and social organizations, movements, NGOs and trade unions of both regions, the EU and Latin America, and the Caribbean have discussed EU-LAC relations at the 8th Euro-Latino-American and Caribbean Civil Society Forum, on 11-12 March 2015 in Brussels.

The Cotonou Agreement is the only political agreement with third countries that clearly states and makes the consultation of civil society on co-operation policies, strategies and priorities compulsory (VENRO 2003). It provides a framework for the involvement of non-state actors in the development and implementation of EU strategies and programmes. The Agreement points that the partnership objectives include: "the building of an active and organized civil society" (art.1) and the principles include participation, specifying that the partnership is open to various types actors "comprising the private sector and organizations of civil society" (art.2). The dispositions in art. 4 are also significant (the actors of the partnership) as it establishes that non-state actors "be informed and involved in consultation on cooperation policies and strategies..., and on the political dialogue", "be provided with financial resources ...", "be involved in the implementation of cooperation project and programmes...", "be provided with capacity-building support in critical areas in order to reinforce the capabilities of these actors, and the establishment of consultation mechanisms".

Article 7 of the Agreement identifies the need for capacity building of CSOs to participate effectively: “The contribution of civil society to development can be enhanced by strengthening community organizations and non-profit non-governmental organizations in all spheres of cooperation. This will require that the creation and development such organizations be encouraged and supported; to enable such organizations to be involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of development strategies and programmes”.

The Treaty chapter on political dialogue sets out that representatives of CSOs shall be associated with this dialogue through both the Council of Ministers and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. On this basis, civil society observers, 4 from the EU and 4 from the ACP countries, are regularly attending the Joint Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers to undertake ongoing dialogue with representatives of social and economic partners and other actors of civil society. The first meeting was held in May 2003 and focused on good governance.

In virtue of the dispositions of the Cotonou Agreement, the European Commission (2002) has adopted a special Communication on the participation of civil society in EU development policies, and in 2004 the Guidelines on principles for the participation of non-state actors (European Commission 2004).

NGOs, aside from participating in official mechanisms of consultation, gave rise to independent forums whose aim is to guarantee the grease participation of the many organized expressions of civil society. In 1997, following the first ACP-NGO Conference in Entebbe, Uganda was set up by the ACP Civil Society Forum as a platform for CSOs from the ACP regions. The Forum is a network working on ACP-EU cooperation issues from within ACP countries. It strives for an appropriate, democratic and transparent framework of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.

In 2004, owing to an ACP Civil Society Forum initiative (Koekebakker 2013), the European Centre for Development Policy

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Management (ECDPM), Europe's Forum on International Cooperation (EUFORIC), European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (EUROSTEP), and Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) established the ACP-EU Civil Society Information Network Project with the aims to extend and enhance the appropriate use of information and communication technologies by civil society actors in the ACP and Europe. Through the network, organizations become better informed about evolving ACP-EU policies and ongoing initiatives. The project is expected to bring greater equality to policy debates and also raise awareness in Europe about ACP development problems. In its first three years, the project has focused on knowledge sharing and partnership-building on issues in the Cotonou Agreement, including programming, international trade arrangements, poverty reduction, conflict, ACP-EU parliamentary relations and sustainable development.

The challenge for the CSOs is to find a way to turn the provisions of Cotonou Agreement into concrete actions and policies, to ensure a systematic consultation between civil society and EU through effective channels of dialogue, and to strengthen local civil society capacity in order to guarantee access to information, advocacy skills, conflict analysis capability, coalition and network building, etc.

The CSOs operating in the South not only implement the projects funded both by official donors and NGOs but are also uniquely placed to monitor the effectiveness of development cooperation activities and play an increasingly important role in dialogue and promoting citizenship.

The "added value" that such participation can bring is not only based on the knowledge and experience provided by civil society, but also their ability to bridge a critical "gap" between strategic goals and their practical realisation.

All EU agreements and regulations applying to co-operation with developing countries should fully integrate the principles of civil society participation in policy-making and implementation. The provisions included in the Cotonou Agreement should be extended to

other regional cooperation agreements or frameworks. A genuine culture of consultation and participation should be implemented which respects the NGO values, autonomy and capacity.

3. The added value of Human Rights Dialogues

In tandem with democratisation, the rule of law and good governance, as shown, human rights are the main substantive subjects of the ongoing process of political dialogue.

In 2015, the EU held formal human rights dialogues and consultations with 34 partner countries and regional groups. In addition, many of the 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that are party to the Cotonou Agreement engaged in a dialogue with the EU (Council of the European Union 2016, 7).

The HRD is the EU's most important instrument to promote improvements in the human rights situation in third countries. Dialogue becomes a channel of communication which allows the EU to express concern about abuses and seek information about human rights developments. It is also a way to expose the highest level of governments to international human rights standards and best EU practice as well as a vehicle to identify concrete cooperation projects. The HRD is complemented by human rights seminars, which bring together academic experts, NGOs and other representatives from the EU and third country (Wouters et al. 2007).

This dialogue is determined on a case-by-case basis and include the signing, ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments, cooperation with international human rights procedures and mechanisms, fighting against the death penalty, torture, all forms of discrimination, promoting children's rights, women's rights, freedom of expression, the role of civil society, international cooperation in the field of justice, the processes of democratisation and good governance, and the prevention of

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conflict. HRD also includes the preparation and the follow up of the work of the UN Human Rights Council, of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly and of UN international conferences (Smith 2006).

To facilitate informed dialogue, the EU has recently instituted a system of regular confidential reporting on human rights, including torture, by its Heads of Mission in third countries and has provided Heads of Mission with a checklist designed to assure a solid basis to raise the issue in political dialogue.

The Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM), on the basis of the EU Council Conclusions of the 25 June 2001, adopted the "European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues". HRD is considered an instrument of the EU external policy, and a measure which the EU may use to implement its policy on human rights. It constitutes an essential part of the EU strategy finalised to promote human development, peace, security and stability.

The guidelines on HRD have several aims. In particular, to identify the role played by HRD in the global framework of the CFSP and the EU's policy on human rights; to promote a more coherent EU approach in its external relations; to establish the conditions in which it is to be applied and made effective.

HRD objectives include: a) discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on human rights in multinational forums such as the United Nations; b) registering the concern felt by the EU at the human rights situation in the country concerned, gathering information and endeavouring to improve the human rights situation of that country.

The decision to initiate a HRD lies with the EU Council and requires an assessment of the human rights situation in the country concerned that is undertaken by COHOM. The assessment will look at the developments in the human rights situation, the extent to which the government is willing to improve the situation, the commitment of the government in respect of international law of human rights, the government's readiness to cooperate with United

Nations human rights bodies and procedures as well as the government's attitude towards CSOs. The evaluation will then be based on reports by heads of mission, UN bodies and other international or regional organizations, European Parliament and non-governmental organizations, and Commission strategy papers for the countries concerned. The COHOM is also the responsible for following up the dialogue.

Like the political dialogue, the institutionalised HRD are based on regional or bilateral agreements or treaties (Bartels 2005). These include the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement (the more structured dialogue); the Trade, Development, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with third countries¹; the European Neighbourhood Policy (Mediterranean and Eastern European countries); the stabilisation and association agreements (Western Balkans) (Panebianco and Rossi 2004); bilateral relations in the framework of association and cooperation agreements; relations with candidate countries and regional organizations (ASEAN, ASEM, MERCOSUR, Andean Community, etc.)².

Article 9 (Essential Elements and Fundamental Element) of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, recalls the words of the UN Declaration

¹ For example, article 2 (general principles) of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) between the European Community and ten countries of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) states that: "Respect for democracy, principles of international law and human rights as defined in particular in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, (...), underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute *essential elements* of partnership and of this Agreement".

² For example, the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States (Mercosur Party States), of the other part, state at the article 1 that: "Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights inspires the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an *essential element* of this Agreement".

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on human development (1986) stating that "cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centred on the human person, who is the main protagonist and beneficiary of development" and that respect for all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural - and fundamental freedoms including democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development. The article recalls the principles of universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights as well as the principles of the equality of men and women and of the participatory democracy. It states that democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are *essential elements* and good governance is a *fundamental element* of the Agreement (Arts 2003). The Parties pledge to respect their international obligations and commitments concerning human rights. They reiterate their deep attachment to human dignity and human rights, which are legitimate aspirations of individuals and peoples. These areas are considered "an important subject for the political dialogue".

There is another kind of dialogue in the context of special relations with third countries like USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Associated countries. The implementation of these dialogues is carried out at meetings taking place on a six-monthly basis attended by experts and representatives of civil society and of European Union institutions. For instance, these dialogues take place before the annual sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the UN Human Rights Council) and the UN General Assembly. The main objectives are to discuss issues of common interest and to identify sectors of cooperation within multilateral organizations. In addition to dialogues at EU level, each member state promotes dialogues with third countries at national level.

The more regular and institutionalised HRD with a third country is the one between EU and China (Kinzelbach 2015; European Commission and High Representative 2016). The EU is committed to helping promote human rights in China in an active, sustained and constructive way. Human rights are mainly discussed in the framework of both the larger political dialogue as well as a specific dialogue on human rights. This dialogue was set up in 1996. The 34th round of the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights took place in Beijing on 30 November and 1 December 2015 (Council of the European Union 2016). Usually two rounds of the dialogue take place every year, under EU Presidency. It allows the EU to channel all issues of concern, such as the death penalty, re-education through labour, ethnic minorities' rights, civil and political freedoms, individual cases etc., in a forum where China is committed to responding. The dialogue has yielded some concrete results: visits to China by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, signing of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratification of the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, release of prisoners, setting up of Commission co-operation projects. But the EU has made it clear, on several occasions, that it wanted the dialogue to lead to more tangible improvements in the human rights situation.

Another relevant dialogue was set up in 2002 with Iran. The primary aim of the dialogue was to improve the human rights situation. It was expected that Iranian and European institutions cooperate on various activities which will in time add to the interest for and bring into focus the human rights situation in the country. The cooperation included, among other things, the training, research and exchange of information between the parliament, the judicial system, universities, NGOs and national human rights institutions. The Agenda of Iran human rights dialogue includes issues on discrimination and torture, fair trial, freedom of expression and the right to development, administration and justice, as well as the enhancement of international cooperation and solidarity in the field

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of human rights. No EU-Iran human rights dialogue sessions have followed since 2005.

4. The peculiarities of Intercultural dialogue

Within EU external action intercultural dialogue (ICD) can be understood as a tool that aims to engage, by fostering mutual understanding and cooperation, the civil societies of Europe and of partner countries and regions into a common effort to attenuate the tensions which derive from a set of cultural, social and political divergences among the people and governments of the EU and those of other areas. While political dialogue and HRD are employed by the EU worldwide, the origin and development of ICD has remained deeply linked to the advancement of EU policies in the Mediterranean (de Perini 2015). Moreover, in this context, differently from the other dialogues, through which even when broader regional frameworks are involved the EU also acts bilaterally with single states, ICD has developed as a shared and tentatively regionally "co-owned" practice. This peculiarity is mostly due to the fact that the political and stability questions characterising the Mediterranean basin as a whole were considered by EU leaders as cultural questions, and that working on exchanges on culture-related issues was perceived as an effective way to ensure peace, stability and mutual understanding in the overall Euro-Mediterranean space (European Commission 1994; Prodi 2002).

The EU formally introduced ICD within its Mediterranean policy in 1995, when it established the EMP. Over the years, the EU has also promoted ICD in other areas of its external action. During the 2000s, for instance, references to ICD were made in the largely mentioned Cotonou Agreement (2000) between the EU and ACP countries, in the Vienna Declaration adopted in May 2006 at the closing of the 4th EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit, and in the context of the "Eastern Partnership", created in 2009 to provide a

collective framework of cooperation between Europe and its eastern neighbours. The European Commission has also actively contributed to the elaboration and ratification of the Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, almost unanimously adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 20 October 2005. The EU has actively participated also in the initiatives and programmes carried out by international institutions including the United Nations, through the Alliance of Civilisations, the Council of Europe, OSCE, etc. (for an overview of the approaches to ICD of these organisations, see Valenti 2007). In those cases, however, ICD has featured as one of many diversified items in a cumulative list of options available to enhance cooperation with partner countries or to promote respect for diversity, and has often been developed according to the view of this dialogue advanced by other institutions. Conversely, in the Mediterranean context, the EU developed a specific idea of ICD over more than two decades, exploring different conceptions, objectives and fields of action.

Despite this long-standing commitment, the EU efforts to advance ICD have remained quite vague. The objectives of this dialogue, for instance, have changed, even substantially, depending on the period in which ICD is observed. In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, for instance, ICD was not treated as a priority by EU institutions and members states, which were more concerned with the security and economic dimension of their political dialogue with the countries of the Mediterranean. The goal set for ICD was thus broad and ineffectual and referred to dialogue as a non-better specified “factor” helpful for creating mutual understanding and “bringing the people of Europe and Mediterranean closer” (EMP 1995). This broad goal was stated without spelling the ultimate goal of this effort, the “what for” (Bekemans 2007).

A few years later, ICD became more strategic for EU external action, due in particular to the growing threats to political and social stability of Euro-Mediterranean relations brought by the sudden

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raise of the threat of religious fundamentalism following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and by the connected growth of xenophobic incidents in Europe especially vis-à-vis migrants from Mediterranean countries (see data from FRA 2007, 122-124). The attacks of 2001, the ensuing "war on terror", and the outbreak of the second Intifada between Israelis and Palestinians in the early 2000s pushed the EU to turn ICD into a priority of EU foreign policy (Silvestri 2005; Gillespie 2003; Jünemann 2003b). The "Guiding principles" on ICD that emerged following negotiations among European institutions and states, on one hand, and Mediterranean governments, on the other, defined ICD as an appropriate instrument to achieve constructive interaction and effective cooperation among nations, to contribute to mutual understanding and to enrich common "Mediterranean" values. ICD was also described as an efficient means of conflict prevention, "which required the active participation of civil society, both by institutions and individuals distinguished in the fields of thought, culture and society". Moreover, ministers agreed that ICD should have become an "important instrument to fight fanaticism of any kind, extremism, racism and xenophobia" (EMP 2003, items 15-16).

A further contribution to define the objectives of ICD during this period was given by a group of experts summoned by the-then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, with a view to give contents and values to ICD in the period of regression characterising Euro-Mediterranean relations during the Mid-2000s. Within such expert framework, the main objective of ICD came to be that of contributing "to the emergence of an appropriate region-wide political response to the challenges of globalisation with the long-term objective of preparing the ground to integrate in daily life the principal complementarities of the two halves of the Euro-Mediterranean area" (RHLAG 2003, 3; 12).

In the current Mediterranean milieu that emerged from the "Arab uprisings", the goals of ICD changed again and started to be connected explicitly to a more general EU commitment towards

promoting civil society engagement, especially among the youth, within the current effort of supporting human rights and the ongoing democratization processes in the countries affected by revolts, especially in Egypt and Tunisia (Aubarell 2012; Walton 2012).

There has been, in other words, a constant realignment of the goals of ICD in EU external action which seems to depend also on how the advancement of this dialogue could have helped enhancing the broader “milieu goals” (Wolfers 1962) of the EU’s broader political dialogue with these countries over time. ICD was developed as one peculiar sector of political dialogue in the 1990s and, specifically, as a priority of EU sectoral security dialogue during the 2000s. Over the last few years, ICD has eventually become a direct contribution to the HRD developed since 1995 by the EU with the countries of the Mediterranean basin adhering to EU initiatives.

These changing objectives of ICD have been pursued through the implementation of a series of cooperation programmes decided and funded by the European Commission in fields such as heritage, media, youth cooperation, higher education, arts and creativity, inter-religious dialogue and conflict prevention. ICD programmes and initiatives were launched at various moments of Euro-Mediterranean relations and came to represent separate layers of different, at times overlapping conceptions of how to foster ICD, as well as having different beneficiaries, fields of action and target groups, all of these without a significant amount of coordination. Indeed, despite the fact that the EU has advanced many of these programmes in areas connected to arts and “consciously crafted symbolic works” (Ahearne 2009, 142), the primary culture-related basis and target of this policy tool have been the different systems of values and attitudes of the people living in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Accordingly, the actual common thread of all ICD programmes promoted by the EU in its external action, rather than a focus on cultural expressions and cooperation has been that all of them have included among their objectives a specific focus on the cultural and

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religious diversity of its participants, regardless of the sector of cooperation.

ICD can thus be eventually understood as a cultural foreign policy instrument of the EU, that is, one of those tools sharing a culture-related basis, an effort to influence people more than governments, and the fact of operating over a much longer term than other foreign policy instruments (Hill 2003, 135-138). However, although, in accordance with this notion, ICD has been always presented by the EU as an instrument to, for and of the civil society, the main role in the definition and advancement of this tool has been attributed to processes of intergovernmental negotiations. These negotiations re-defined and hampered much more ambitious inputs coming from European institutions, mostly the European Commission, and civil society networks in Europe and in partner countries. Thus, although NGOs, cultural associations and artists are the main actors involved in the daily practice of ICD, the priorities of this practice have been decided and defined from the top-down.

The main example of this process is the structure of the Anna Lindh Foundation. This is an ad hoc institution launched on initiative of the EU in 2005 precisely to advance a stronger ICD in the Euro-Mediterranean space, located in Alexandria, Egypt and co-funded by the EU, its member states and Mediterranean partner countries. Despite the core of the mission of the Foundation is to coordinate, make interact and enhance a networks of national networks of CSOs into an effective ICD process, the main decisions concerning the programmes of action, priorities and members of the Foundation are made by an executive Board composed of ambassadors from European and Mediterranean countries. This decision made the actions of the Foundation and thus, of a relevant component of EU's ICD efforts, increasingly dependent on specific national interests rather than, as it might have been expected, on civil society input (Del Sarto 2007, 43).

From this brief overview it is possible to conclude that, in terms of actors, the development of ICD in the framework of EU external

action has been advanced at a three-fold level: a macro-level, where general ideas about the scope and goals of ICD are raised by EU institutions and officials and presented through policy documents or declarations; a intermediate level within which EU institutions and partner governments dialogue about, or rather discuss, the broad scope of ICD and negotiate the definition of the real objectives and mechanisms of implementation of this tool according to their national interests; and a micro-level, where CSOs and individuals, within a framework which, as seen, has been developed from the top-down, try to carry out on a daily basis their concrete dialogue on diversity for mutual understanding, knowledge and respect, providing their alternative bottom-up response to the social and political regression affecting human dignity and human relations.

5. *Conclusions*

The three typologies of EU dialogues analysed in this essay are certainly interdependent and share the same objectives of peace and human security. They are founded on shared values as the ones proclaimed in the Treaty on European Union as well as, at a universal level, in the United Nations Charter and in the international legal instruments on human rights. To the EU dialogue, whether the broader Political dialogue or the sectorial HRD and ICD, appears as a means to back “preventive diplomacy” even when faced by global terrorist threats, regional conflicts, the rise of fundamentalisms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, in principle, in today’s milieu of international relations, dialogues and cooperation are essential instruments for the development of international politics and for the promotion of effective multilateralism.

In practice, however, the above analysis suggests that EU external dialogues, although increasingly pursued over more than two deca-

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des, need to be revised and integrated if the EU wants to make dialogue a really substantial contribution to the primary ambition of contributing to peace and security in EU's surroundings and in the whole world (see High Representative 2016, 5). In particular, although the EU has *de facto* developed HRD and ICD as contributions to its broader political dialogue, and although the same typologies of actors are involved, at different levels, in all dialogues, European foreign-policy makers have never considered the possible implications of framing all these dialogic efforts into a specific "strategy". The EU has, in other words, attributed to dialogue a loose function in the broader context of its external action, intending it as a *modus operandi* rather than treating dialogues as integrated components of a toolbox that could really make a difference to putting its values into practice within broader external action.

This notwithstanding, integrating all existing dialogues into a more consistent and coherent operative frame would certainly make this *modus operandi* more effective and strategic. Indeed, if the success of EU dialogues depends on a greater opening to human rights, to democratic principles and to civil society institutions on the part of third countries, it must be pointed that, often, these partners seem more interested in economic cooperation than in the adoption of international human rights standards, in the creation of joint security strategies, or in the enhancement of intercultural exchanges. Their adhesion to EU principles of democracy and human rights in some cases appears more formal than substantial, and is motivated by the fact that the EU considers these values an essential elements of partnership agreements. In light of this discouraging trend, if dialogues were integrated into a coherent and mutually reinforcing foreign policy strategy, consistent with the value-paradigm of EU external action, the pursued greater opening to these central values by EU's partners would be reached more easily.

How could this outcome be achieved? First of all, synergic partnerships need to be created in the various "dialogues", with better division of labour among the actors involved which would improve

the “dialogues governance”. The principle of subsidiarity could work as a guiding principle in “dialogues decision making” and in the implementation of “dialogue policies”. In particular, there should be a clearer distribution of the tasks of governments, intergovernmental bodies and supranational institutions. The way in which the EU is structured internally could serve as a model of reference in this regard: with heads of state and government meetings (summits) having the role of setting out the general orientations and the priorities of dialogue; intergovernmental bodies and supranational institutions having the role of elaborating programmes on the basis of orientations and the priorities devised by the summits (with the active participation of parliamentary institutions); and national governments and the European Commission having the role of implementing the programmes and carrying out the policies. Following the approach of subsidiarity, moreover, it is evident that CSOs and local government bodies should have the guarantee of more transparent and effective channels of participation, especially in the context of ICD.

Transparency is another area where the EU needs improving. It is indeed difficult to systematically collect relevant information about the contents, achievements and failures of the various dialogic experiences especially in the context of HRD and ICD. This lack of accessible data makes also very difficult to evaluate if these dialogues are having impact on partners’ political choices. Having systematic and transparent information, by contrast, would allow opening the “black box” of EU dialogues, also favouring a more direct engagement of CSOs into them, both in a functions of involved actors and as watchdogs of dialogues coherence.

Overall, it must be stressed that, even if these suggestions are followed, it will remain very difficult to assess the outcomes and results of EU dialogues in terms of greater democracy, rule of law and the respect of human rights, in terms of internal peace and world peace, both in national political systems and in world political system,

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also in consideration of the huge numbers of variables that contribute influencing partners' decisions in the fields where dialogues are pursued. This situation should not be an excuse for the EU to avoid improving the effectiveness and integration of its dialogues. After all, even in 1975, when the "process of Helsinki" between East and West was launched the results were unclear. In 1989 everyone understood that those dialogues, that lasted 14 years, had yielded extraordinary results in terms of structural transformation of world order: ending a bipolar era and of opposing blocks, fall of the Soviet empire, the start of democratization processes, the entry of many former communist countries into NATO and the EU.

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Reason and Human Nature in Multicultural Societies

Gabriele De Anna

Abstract

Multiculturalism is a hallmark of our times, and it brings with it a challenge to our societies and to our political institutions. How should we react to the diversity which pervades our societies? Two main leading contemporary ways of thinking give opposite answers to this question. On the one hand, the tradition of the Enlightenment assures that human reason is universal and encourages us to overlook cultural differences, in order to define procedures for political decisions that work for everyone. On the other hand, postmodernism claims that our reason is not as universal as modern philosophy assumed, and we can only cope with the current social situation by making cultures live one next to the other, without attempting to reach a shared view. Both positions make rational debate among cultures politically irrelevant. This essay offers an interpretation of practical reason, which shows that the truth is somewhere in the middle between the two leading positions. The upshot is that a dialectic among cultures is a necessary ingredient of the practical processes of development that our multicultural societies need to go through.

1. Introduction

Globalization processes seem to have accelerated in the past few years, and we inevitably live in societies, which are much more diverse than we could have expected only few years ago. Multicultur-

alism is a hallmark of our times, and it brings with it a challenge to our societies and to our political institutions. How should we react to the diversity which pervades our societies? On the one hand, the tradition of modern philosophy, especially that of the Enlightenment, assures that human reason is universal and that its validity stretches behind any cultural and traditional differences (Zafirovski 2011). If this were true, we could just overlook cultural differences, and, on a political level, try to use our universal reason to define procedures for political decisions that work for everyone, regardless one's cultural background. On the other hand, postmodernism reacts against the Enlightenment and accuses it of being too abstract: our reason, postmodernists claim, is not as universal as modern philosophy assumed, and we can only cope with the current social situation by making cultures live one next to the other, without attempting to reach a shared view (Hicks 2004). Both positions have the consequence that a rational debate among cultures is politically irrelevant: one side takes reason to bypass cultures, the other claims that it cannot raise above them.

In this essay, I will offer an interpretation of practical reason – relying on arguments that I have put forward somewhere else (De Anna 2016) – which shows that the truth is somewhere in the middle between the two positions that I have just mentioned. Our reason is indeed closely tied to our identity, as postmodernism claims, but it can also raise above cultures, since it is a capacity for self-reflection, which is a common feature of human nature and is therefore shared by humans coming from all cultural backgrounds. The upshot will be that a dialectic among cultures is a necessary ingredient of the practical processes of development that our multicultural societies need to go through. In the next section, I will consider a common conception of politics, i.e. the social contract tradition, which fulfils the hopes of the Enlightenment about reason, by trying to outline neutral political procedures capable of by passing the problems of cultural diversity, without engaging with the cultures themselves. I will argue that this conception of politics opens up several problems

concerning practical reason. In the third section, I will discuss the nature of practical reason and argue that it has some universalistic features, but also some features which link it to particular cultures. In the fourth section, I will show how the account of practical reason I have proposed can be used to argue that a dialectics among cultures is called for in the domain of politics, in our current multicultural societies.

2. Universality and particularity in the social contract tradition

The idea that attention to cultural heritages should be avoided in political contexts is typically supported on social-contract grounds. The social contract tradition contends that political communities are established through an arbitrary act of individuals, who initially live independently one from the other and who, at some point, decide – based on what their reasons suggest – that living together is to the best advantage of each of them. Hence, they subscribe a contract and give rise to a political society. In recent times, this view received a sophisticated and incredibly well thought out formulation by John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice* (1971).

Rawls' account is founded on a conception of practical reason, according to which reason is universal, i.e. it can choose according to criteria that apply to anyone, anywhere, and at any time. His claim is that we can understand what is best to do if we imagine what one would choose to do while standing behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. without knowing the contingencies of one's own life. Imagine that you do not know anything about yourself, e.g. race, level of instruction, wealth, social standing, job, accepted values, all sorts of preferences, and so on. In Rawls' view, from behind the veil of ignorance, we all would consider best a social setting which assumes two fundamental principles: the existence of a system of equal liberties for everyone, and a principle of redistribution of the available goods that he called Maxmin. According to Maxmin, it is rational to

choose the outset which grants the highest possible share (max), to those who occupy the lowest levels of society (min). For Rawls, a just political system is one in which the institutions and legal settings respect the two fundamental principles. Since the two basic principles are universally rational and are acceptable to anyone, any political system which satisfies them should also be acceptable to anyone.

From this point of view, a political system is universally acceptable, since it is neutral, i.e. is not committed to any particular view of the good or of truth. Let us recall that the two basic principles are chosen behind the veil of ignorance, where one does not even know what one's conception of the good is. That means that the principles are chosen regardless of what one's conception of the good might be. This is what makes the principles universal.

Social-contract theory offers the premises needed for an argument for proceduralism. Proceduralism is a legal and political theory according to which the establishment and the respect of right or fair procedures is sufficient for the legitimacy of a legal system or a political power. The word "sufficient" is crucial. Any reasonable theorist would recognise that procedures are necessary. A very simple argument seems very compelling in this sense: without procedures, we could not apply the law in a consistent way, and this would be unacceptable for any reasonable understanding of the nature of justice. Proceduralism wants to claim more: the point is that when the right procedures are implemented and followed, a law or a decision is always legitimate, no matter what its content might be.

The outlook of politics offered by the social contract tradition can furnish the premises for an argument to the conclusion that cultures and heritages should not matter in the political arena. The basic principles of a just society, as we have seen, are chosen behind a veil of ignorance, and that means that the person choosing them has no idea of what her or his cultural affiliations are. Any political system respecting those basic principles will be neutral when it comes to differences in metaphysical outlooks, value-choices, or cultural backgrounds. Institutional and legal procedures will be cor-

rect if they respect neutrality and follow the basic principles. Hence, the cultural differences among people will be politically irrelevant, as far as a state can implement just procedures and people will generally adhere to them.

The idea that a political system can be neutral in the suggested sense was widely criticised and Rawls himself revised his own view at a later stage (1993). The main stream of criticism came from the outlook which became known as communitarianism. Philosophers including Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (1989) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) complained that practical reason does not quite match the description provided by Rawls. The main point is: what is left of a self when we have hidden most of its features behind a veil? On what grounds can that self make choices at all, without knowing what its criteria really are? Communitarians generally stress the importance of communities, in building the subjectivity of agents and thereby in furnishing them the rational and emotion tools that they deploy when they make their choices. The upshot is that cultures, conceptions of the good and values are not politically irrelevant and political systems cannot be neutral. The practical reason of each person would be totally dependent on the culture of that person. One cannot escape the heritage of one's tradition, since that heritage furnishes the very criteria that one uses to make choices.

Someone could object that conversions are a counterexample, but communitarians reject this move: they claim that events that are commonly considered conversions are either led by the criteria of the original culture, and thus they are not really conversions, or they are irrational leaps.

Communitarians brought a new emphasis to the notions of tradition and community, but they did it at the expense of reason: trans-cultural judgements are ultimately irrational. The argument between liberals and communitarians can be seen as a contemporary instantiation of the historically more pervasive debate that I mentioned in the introduction, that between supporters of the idea of a universal

reason and those who support the thesis that practical reason is culturally relative.

Communitarian objections to the liberal conception of reason are well made, but their alternative view of reason is also unsatisfying. We have a normative intuition according to which certain actions are wrong for everyone, apart from distinctions of cultures. An example might be gratuitously killing an innocent person. If someone says that one's culture allows this, we would think that there must be something wrong with that culture. Furthermore, these deeds are usually evaluated in similar manners in cultures which are very different from one another. This suggests that we can nurse more hope in the possibility that reason might achieve universal consensus than communitarians recognise. There must be something wrong with their view of practical reason too.

A rejoinder to both these positions is found in the *mixed proposal*, i.e. a group of views, which support the importance of cultures on liberal grounds, the paradigmatic example being the thought of Will Kymlicka (1995, 2001). These views develop Rawls' position in a direction which is meant to recognise the importance of cultures. These positions accept Rawls' conception of practical reason and his view that politics is mainly committed to granting the maximum possible expansion of everyone's liberty (let us recall that Rawls' first principle of a just society calls for a system of equal liberties). At the same time, however, these views suggest that cultures and values are politically relevant. The argument starts from the recognition that in order to effectively exercise one's liberty, one must be able to find, in the social environment, the resources that one needs. However, one's wishes are largely culture-dependent, and therefore there could be no protection of liberty without the protection of forms of life which make the exercise of the relevant wishes possible. One could not choose to engage in competitive chess playing, for example, if there were no chess community, no chess tournaments, etc. The very protection of individual liberty, hence, calls for the protection and the empowerment of the cultural forms in which individuals want to ex-

ercise their choices. This concession to cultures does not risk the relativistic consequences of communitarianism: following Rawls, the mixed position suggests that a well-formed political system will only allow in its domain those cultures which are compatible with the protection of the freedom of all.

The mixed position attempts to reconcile the universal and the culturally relative conceptions of reason. It manages to acknowledge the importance of cultures, without giving up the possibility that reason reaches a universal perspective. The proposal, however, has some problems and I will mention here two. Firstly, it does not really address the objection about the nature of practical reason that communitarianism raised against Rawls, i.e. the objection that when all criteria are hidden from her view, the subject isn't in a position to make a choice. Secondly, the proposed reconciliation is problematic: the importance of cultures is granted, but the only cultures acceptable from this point of view are those which share the same conception of the good and the same values of the liberal perspective, i.e. those which would rank the protection of a system of equal liberties as the most fundamental principle. The problem is that neutrality does not seem an achievable political target. The claim that the most important goal of society is to put, as much as, possible, all individuals in the position where they can do what they desire depends on a particular conception of what is valuable and good. Cultures which do not share this priority cannot simply be ruled out as unreasonable: a suitable conception of practical reason should be able to engage these perspectives too.

3. Practical reason and the role of human nature

In recent years, debates on practical reason have made much progress, due to philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe (1957), John McDowell (1998), and Thomas Nagel (1986), to mention only a few names, which lie behind the reflections which follow. The re-

sults of these discussions offer a solution to the problems that both sides face in the debate between communitarians and liberals. In this section, I will try to show why this is so, by summarizing an account of practical reason which I have argued for previously (De Anna 2015). In the next section, I will suggest that the ensuing view of practical reason can account for the importance of cultures and heritages in politics, while taking into account the normative intuition and explaining how reason can have a universal value.

Practical reason has to do with choices in practical situations, hence with human action. An action is a doing which belongs to the agent. Not all doings belong to agents. If someone pushes me and I hit someone else, the hitting is something my body does, but it is not my action. Actions are doings for which an agent can give a reasons as the answer to the question: "Why did you do it?". "Why did you give money to that begger?" Answer: "Because he is hungry."

What are reasons for actions, then? They certainly involve facts. "Because he is hungry" offers a fact as a reason. But that is not enough. They are facts concerning an object that the agent must see as valuable (in the example: the human person who is begging); those facts must involve some deficiency in the valuable object (the beggar is hungry); the agent must have the power to make the valuable object better off (I have no reason to do anything, if there is nothing I can do). All this suggests that reasons have an objective side (a fact) and a subjective side (the way in which the subject responds to the fact).

I mentioned above that we share a normative intuition. That intuition is now relevant again, since it suggests that not all ways of responding to a situation by a subject are equally acceptable. I could give the money to the beggar or offer him a sandwich. We would consider both these ways of responding as good. However, I could ignore him, and be insensitive to his starvation. Or I could respond to the starvation by killing him. Both these two latter responses would be wrong. Now the problem is: what constrains the range of viable responses to a situation?

Let us remember that we are talking about practical reason, i.e. reason at work in action. That means that we have to consider how normative constraints shape action from the point of view of the agent. From that point of view, the question about what the right ways of responding to a situation are takes the following form: “The fact *f* seems to me a reason to do action *a*, but is it really such?” Raising this doubt amounts to asking how a well-functioning human being would respond in the same situation. That means that normativity arises from the consideration by an agent of how a well-functioning human being should be and how she would respond to the facts of the situation.

The result we reached accounts for two features of practical reason that we considered above: its universality and its dependence on culture. When an agent wonders how a well-functioning human being would react in the situation, she asks a question about human nature, about what all humans are and how they should be. On the other hand, the agent has no other way of conceiving how a well-functioning human being would respond than considering examples of humans whom she has encountered and who were flourishing, happy, respected and appreciated by others. That means that the agent’s judgements about human nature are concretely shaped by her experience of humanity and human flourishing.

It is important to stress that the judgements about flourishing and about what counts as successful realisations of human life that an agent gives, depend on the kind of human being the agent is. They depend on her way of responding to surrounding facts, and therefore they depend on the form of life she is engaged in. Ultimately, they depend on her “culture”. The upshot is that there is no absolute point of view on human nature or on the good that we can access *a priori*. We form and shape our appreciation of the good through our engagement in our lives. This does not mean that judgements are completely subjective or agent-relative: they are objective to the extent that they concern facts. To the extent that humans share a common nature, we can hope to be able to find

shared views on what the best way of responding to practical situations are.

The view of practical reason that we have acquired acknowledges the importance of cultures for practical reasons in a similar way to communitarians. It claims, indeed, that only through the experience of humanity that an agent has in her culture, can she form a notion of a flourishing life to be employed in practical reasoning. At the same time, however, the proposed view follows Rawls in endorsing a universal conception of reason: given our common humanity, it is possible that we comprehend the ways that others respond, even if they are culturally very different from us. We can also hope that mutual recognition and dialogue can lead us to overcome conflicts between views, even if, of course, we can have no guarantee that an agreement can be reached in all situations. The proposed view also overcomes the failure of the mixed proposal to achieve neutrality: it recognises that neutrality is impossible, and at the same time it does not exclude *a priori* all cultures that do not share the liberal view on the priority of liberty. Liberals can hope that members of cultures which are very far from theirs can see the point of their values and recognise that their perspective opens better chances for human flourishing.

4. *Practical reason in multicultural societies*

Our multicultural societies set us in complex practical contexts: we need to make choices, which influence (and are influenced by) people who do not share our cultural background. This is problematic, since the perspective on practical reason that we have reached highlights the importance of individual features of subjects for practical reason. One responds to situations in ways which are shaped by one's sensitivity, and one's sensitivity is in its turn shaped by one's education, by one's habits and by the examples of successful and unsuccessful human life that one encountered in one's social

environment throughout one's life. This means that cultures have a prior role in shaping the practical sensitivity of their members. In what follows, I will construe some arguments that assume this premise and, by joining it with various consideration about the nature of society, of politics and of cultures, conclude that a dialectics among cultures can be beneficial in the practical situations in which current social conditions set us. By "dialectics among" cultures, I mean a rationally based debate concerning fundamental values and goods.

The first point I want to make, is that by confronting other cultures, we can reach a better awareness of the presuppositions of our own background and a critical stance about it, which may lead to an improvement of our own culture. Very often, our sensitivity to practical situations is shaped by strong dislikes or strong predilections for kinds of situations that are inherited from our cultures. Sometimes these dislikes and predilections depend on features, which are not essential for the relevant kinds of situations, but depend on contingencies of those kinds which were typical of our past and which are the result of our historical evolution. Knowing other cultures and their historical trajectories may help us to recognise the contingency of some of the features of these kinds of situation, which are relevant in triggering our responses. Hence, learning other cultures is helpful, in order to tune our sensitivity in practical situations. Let us consider an example. I will use a trivial one, in order to bypass possible interferences of disagreements in the evaluation of real cases. Suppose that someone dislikes philosophy since philosophers are excessively narcissistic and they always talk about things, which are only interesting for themselves. Suppose also that one is justified in having this sensitivity, given the state of philosophy in one's society. By looking at the role of philosophy in other cultures, however, one might realise that some great philosophers are relevantly different from those common in one's own cultural environment. This may lead one to recognise that one's response to philosophy has to be more finely tuned, and that one can be open

to forms of philosophizing different from that typical of one's culture, which might contribute to a rich and flourishing life.

The second point that I want to make is that the knowledge of the literary traditions of other cultures can help one to understand better human nature. Literature, as a form of art, offers idealised representations of life, which highlight the fundamental values of the culture which produced the work and offer deep insights into universal features of humanity. In this way, literature offers representations of the practical sensitivity typical of its background culture. Such representations can highlight the profoundly human aspects of particular cultural forms of life, but they can also point to weaknesses and other dangers to human flourishing. Consequently, knowing the literature of other cultures can be important for improving our practical sensitivity, for various reasons. Firstly, through literature we take a distance from ourselves and from our forms of life, and become capable of seeing them as though from outside. This experience is sometimes very strong and effective in pointing to what goes wrong with our lives, and how we should change them. Secondly, by reading literature from cultures different from ours, we can engage enlightening representations of those cultures and appreciate what aspects of human flourishing can be grasped through them.

The third and last point I want to make is that a dialectic among cultures can strengthen, not endanger (as proceduralism would have it), political unity and the efficacy of political decisions. Proceduralism tries to reach political agreement through the implementation of abstract procedures, which are insensitive to cultural differences. The resulting agreement will be rather unstable, since the procedures may be differently interpreted by members of different cultures and diverse effects may be expected. Delusion and dissatisfaction will be open dangers and society will be unstable. By contrast, on the base of the premises I proposed, we can reach a different perspective on political agreement, based on a dialectics among cultures. Indeed, as we have seen above, practical reason works by trying to understand how the universal human nature can be best

realised in a given practical situation. On this base, we can be confident that a dialectics among cultures will allow the common recognition at least of some features of human nature as relevant in the situation. Consequently, members of different cultural backgrounds will be able to share at least some ends of action, and it will be clear which ends cannot be shared, at least for the time being. Starting from this recognition, practical solutions can be framed, in which common ends can be pursued and diverging interests protected. Awareness of what can and what cannot be shared protects from false expectations and from delusion. Ultimately, this strengthens political and social ties and prevents the unnoticed rise of antagonisms.

5. Conclusion

The perspective on practical reason that I outlined shows how universalism about reason and the cultural-relative understanding of it are both too extreme, in different ways. By contrast, I argued that having practical reason for humans means that they seek with their actions what seems good to them, that is: what they take to have reasons to do. This purports that purely procedural solutions to our practical problems will not be sufficient: there will be no peace in society, no stability, unless most members of society can consciously share a good deal of their reasons for action. Sharing reasons for action, however, requires akin sensitivities. Reflection on human life, on what human flourishing is, on how humans can become and develop is necessary in order to achieve a harmony of sensitivities. This kind of activity, however, is precisely what a dialectics among cultures, in all its forms, does. Certainly, peace and prosperity call for politicians and administrators who have technical expertise and can build and manage apt legal and administrative procedures. But that does not suffice. They call also for politicians and administrators who have the cultural background needed to understand cultures different from theirs and to engage in debates

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about ways of human flourishing. Politicians must be able to justify their choices by showing that they serve human nature, in all the cultural forms that it can take.

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Conflict and Cooperation: The Point of View of Cognitive Science

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Abstract

In this article we explore the contribution that the contemporary literature offers in the field of political philosophy. In particular, the authors argue that, in order to make the reflection on social justice more reliable and effective, political philosophers should take into account the anthropological model that emerges from recent cognitive research regarding self-assertiveness, egoism, competition, pro-sociality, cooperation and altruism.

1. *Homo oeconomicus* and *Homo homini lupus*

Both political philosophy (modern and contemporary) and economics (especially the neoclassical school) tend to rest on individualistic anthropological underpinnings. The *homo oeconomicus* model presupposed by mainstream economic theory is a perfect illustration of that: according to the standard definition, this is a rational and self-interested agent who, when choosing, always pursues the maximization of his/her own well-being (generally understood in terms of utility): and, because of his/her calculating and self-centered qualities, the *homo oeconomicus* has traditionally been intended as a very good economic agent – and, actually, as the *best* economic agent.

As to political philosophy, a clear example of the individualistic orientation is offered by the extremely influential Hobbesian metaphor of the *homo homini lupus* (“the human is a wolf to his fellow human”). Such metaphor perfectly expresses a conception of human nature that underlays many political views according to which, first, individuality is prior to sociality and, second, sociality is a cultural product generated by the necessity to live together in order to avoid a *bellum omnium contra omnes* (Evrigenis 2014). From this perspective, even sovereignty as such rests on individualistic underpinnings, since it is the instrument that allows self-interested individuals preoccupied with their own well-being to live together. Thus, from this point of view humans are not naturally altruistic, civilization is established through the repression and control of instincts, and cooperation can only work at a local level, but not at a general one (for example, there will always be wars between different States).

It is important to notice that, because of the way in which they are defined, the *homo oeconomicus* and the *homo homini lupus* represent anthropological types constitutively unable to engage in authentic interpersonal relationships – individuals who, as it has been ironically noted, nobody would like a child of theirs to be married to (Frank 1991). For this reason, in recent years more than a doubt has been raised regarding the epistemological appropriateness and fecundity of these anthropological types. However, while the models based on the idea of the *homo oeconomicus* have been criticized both at the theoretical and the empirical level (by appealing to the findings of cognitive sciences)¹, the models based on the idea of the *homo homini lupus* have mainly been con-

¹ Some of these critical investigations have underlined the cognitive biases at stake in economic choices and have pointed out the need both to abandon the “folk psychology” on which the standard notion of economic rationality relies (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 2000), and to highlight how the one-sidedness of the *homo oeconomicus* model is not true to the psychological complexity of human choices (Slovic et al. 2002).

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trusted at the level of “pure” (i.e. theoretical) philosophical investigation, as done by the advocates of communitarianism and of recently revitalized cosmopolitanism, who characterize human nature in terms of a strong natural predisposition to pro-sociality and cooperation (which may sometimes be spoilt by society’s historical and cultural needs).

Yet, since cognitive sciences have offered new significant contributions for understanding the attitudes and motivations of human action, it is very plausible that potentially they are also of use in the field of political philosophy. In particular, those sciences have significantly improved our knowledge of the psychological roots of competition and cooperation in the human world, thereby offering us the opportunity to rethink the feasibility of the many political views that assume that self-assertiveness, egoism, and competition are natural human tendencies genetically and conceptually prior to pro-sociality and cooperation (which indeed are taken as merely culturally constructed attitudes).

In order to illustrate this point, let’s consider the discussion on social justice. In this field liberal theories are generally taken to presuppose individualistic views of the person and of cooperation (namely, cooperation just for mutual advantage, as conveyed by the appeal to the social contract)². As we will show, nowadays there are good empirical reasons for thinking that these views are

² This is the standard view (which will be questioned in this article) and it is usually attributed to almost all liberal theories, including contemporary or “new” liberalism and liberal theories of social justice (such as Rawls 1971, Kymlicka 1989, Dworkin 2000). In our view, individualistic conceptions of the person and of cooperation should rather be looked for in classical liberalism, which establishes an intimate relation between liberty and private property (see Gaus 1994 and Steiner, 1994 for a discussion of these issues), as well as in contemporary liberalism (Hayek 1960) and libertarianism (Nozick 1974). In fact, in the latter cases, the centrality attributed to individual freedom has led to the vindication of a decentralized market based on private property (Hayek 1960) and, in the case of Nozick (1974), to a complete rejection of all redistributive demands.

empirically inadequate. However, there are also good reasons for thinking that equally empirically inadequate are the communitarian and cosmopolitan views that, vice versa, give absolute priority to pro-sociality, altruism and cooperation (taken as natural tendencies) over self-assertiveness and competition (taken as culturally generated tendencies).

In our view, in order to make the reflection on social justice more reliable and effective, it is time to develop a sounder anthropological model, more aligned with the findings of cognitive sciences.

2. Individuality and cooperation in the theories of justice

Most contemporary theories of justice that have developed in the framework of liberalism, particularly under the influence of John Rawls's (1971) seminal work, can be seen as attempts to reflect on how different individuals can cooperate with one another in society, so as to shape it in ways that are fair and advantageous for everyone. From the Rawlsian perspective, society is taken as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" (Rawls 1971, p. 4). Cooperation produces a better life for all; however, individuals tend to compete for larger shares of the benefits coming from cooperation. Therefore "a set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine the division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares" (ibid.). The "original agreement", as is well-known, takes the form of an ideal social contract that makes it possible to choose principles of justice that all "free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept", when put in an initial position of equality, conveyed by the original position and the veil of ignorance (ibid., p. 10). The original agreement is therefore conceived as a device that guarantees the fostering of social cooperation on the one hand, and the free pursuit of

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individual interests, provided an initial situation of equality, on the other hand.

In criticizing Rawls's and the other liberal political views, communitarians tend to focus precisely on the centrality they attribute to the individual and on their conception of it. Michael Sandel (1982), for example, famously criticized the appeal of those views to an abstract conception of individuals as pure autonomous choosers, whose commitments, values and concerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self itself, and might therefore be rejected. According to Sandel (1982, ch. 1), this is a barren and "disencumbered" conception of the self, and in order to get a more adequate one, we would need to understand the social pre-conditions of self-determination.

In the communitarian perspective, the self is the outcome of a discovery rather than of an autonomous choice – since every person discovers who they are through their belonging to a community. Therefore the self is best expressed through a narrative conception (MacIntyre 1981), as the story of one person's life is embedded in the story of the communities from which they derive their identity. At last, communities – including the obligations of membership and solidarity they bring about – are prior to individuals, and pro-sociality and cooperation for the common good are prior to the appeal to individual freedom.

Summarizing, most contemporary views of social justice are based on either of two alternative couples of anthropological pre-suppositions. On the one side, the liberals who advocate the theory of justice assume that (i) individuals are naturally self-interested beings and (ii) cooperation is a social construct aimed at fostering individual interests. On the other side, communitarians assume that (i) individuals are naturally cooperative, as they jointly pursue

the common good of their community, and (ii) they derive their identity from their belonging to that community³.

That said, in our view it is time to carry out the discussion on social justice, and on the anthropological presupposition of the different views, in the context of a sounder and empirically more reliable framework. In this way, one can realize that both sets of anthropological assumptions rely on oversimplifications and have been falsified in recent years. In particular, research in cognitive psychobiological sciences has shown that human beings are complex entities that behave in ways that cannot be described as purely competitive or purely cooperative: rather, in their behavior competition and cooperation *naturally* coexist (Bowles et al. 2004; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich et al. 2004; De Caro and Marraffa 2015a). For this reason, in order to be empirically adequate, theories of social justice should account for both the pursuit of self-interest and the forms of pro-sociality and cooperation that jointly characterize human beings.

3. Individuality and cooperation in the light of cognitive sciences

In the last couple of decades investigations of cognitive sciences (especially, in biology, sociology, behavioral economics and psychology) have made clear that sociality does not originate only from culture; rather, it is a dimension that belongs to the defini-

³ It may be noted that the advocates of cosmopolitanism – even if they generally endorse liberal principles and consider the individual person (rather than the government) as the main unit of concern – agree, at least partially, with communitarianism in regard to the anthropological underpinning of their views: in fact, also the cosmopolitan perspective is intrinsically social rather than merely self-interested and embedded in the community. However, the community at stake in cosmopolitanism is the whole humankind (see Pogge 2002 and Benhabib 2002), and this lets cosmopolitans depart from the communitarian focus on local communities.

tion of the human individual itself. In fact, an impressive amount of empirical data has proven beyond reasonable doubt that individuals come to the world already endowed with the tendency to sociality, cooperation and even altruism. Excellent examples in this sense have been offered by Warneken and Tomasello (2008), who have carried out some groundbreaking experiments showing that, since a very early age, humans are endowed with natural predispositions to cooperative and altruistic tendencies. Moreover, and even more surprisingly, those tendencies are present also in chimpanzees, our closest evolutionary relatives. The abstract of Warneken and Tomasello's article reads:

Human infants as young as 14 to 18 months of age help others to attain their goals, for example, by helping them to fetch out-of-reach objects or opening cabinets for them. They do this irrespective of any rewards from adults (indeed external rewards undermine the tendency), and very likely with no concern for such things as reciprocation and reputation, which serve to maintain altruism in other children and adults. Humans' nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees, also help others instrumentally without concrete rewards. These results suggest that human infants are naturally altruistic, and as ontogeny proceeds and they must deal more independently with a wider range of social contexts, socialization and feedback from social interactions with others become important mediators of these initial altruistic tendencies (455).

Many other studies have confirmed that fairness, altruism and cooperative attitudes are very common in the animal world, especially but by no means only, among the primates (De Waal, 2006, 2009, 2013; Burkart, J.M. *et al.* 2014; Yanamoto *et al.* 2014). Another important branch of research concerns the relevance of empathy, taken as a fundamental condition of prosocial attitudes and behavior, and of moral life (Coplan 2011; Stueber 2013). Not less important are the investigations on the so-called "ultimatum

game”, which show that individuals tend to sanction other people’s behavior when this is perceived as unfair, even though these individuals pay a price in terms of personal utility for the sanctioning action (and there is no maximization of general utility either). Moreover, convincing data suggest that genetic factors play an important role in the shaping of human sensibility to fairness (Wallace *et al.* 2007; De Caro and Marraffa 2016, ch. 1).

There is no doubt then that humans are naturally endowed with cooperative and altruistic tendencies. It would be wrong, however, to take the extreme stance – as communitarian and cosmopolitan thinkers often do – that human nature is one-sidedly cooperative and altruistic and that the individualistic and competitive behaviors only have a cultural and social origin. As a matter of fact, many investigations confirm that we are also naturally endowed with individualistic tendencies, which potentially produce conflicts (sometimes very destructive ones) with other individuals (Augoustinos *et al.* 2014).

Taken together, all these findings show that human sociality complies with very complex natural predispositions and that individuals are bearers of a very complex suite of motivations (both individualistic and altruistic) (Murnighan and Wang 2016). Such motivations are intrinsically relational and they give place to complex situations of compromise between two motivational systems: the first committed to self-assertiveness and competition, the second aimed to pro-sociality and cooperation (Lichtenberg, 1989). The specific equilibrium between these two motivational systems at which, within a particular situation, individuals arrive depends on their personal upbringing, social interactions, environmental influences and capacity of rationally controlling their own choices and actions.

The most important moral that follows from what precedes is that – whereas most Western conceptions take competition as natural and cooperation as a culturally-built device – according to this new bio-psychologically-informed anthropological paradigm, human beings are naturally inclined both to competition (some-

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times even destructivity) and to several forms of sociality, cooperation, and even altruism. Moreover, once competition and cooperation are seen in this dialectic relationship, the new paradigm parts company also from the communitarian and cosmopolitan frameworks, which build on an excessively optimistic anthropology, according to which there is nothing natural in competition and conflicts, since they only derive from cultural factors. In brief, neither of the two motivational systems is prior to the other and none can definitely prevail. On the contrary, the constant concurrence of the competitive motivational system and the cooperative one plays a crucial role in the human mind.⁴

In the background of this dynamic, a complex interaction between our emotional system and rational reasoning is at work, in which neither has priority over the other. And also in this regard important work has been developed at the intersection of cognitive moral psychology and philosophy of mind, which should be taken into account if one wants to develop an empirically informed and nuanced enough new anthropological perspective (De Caro and Marraffa 2015b).

4. Social justice revised: integrating individualism and cooperation

According to the data offered by cognitive sciences, individuals are bearers of a very complex suite of motivations. More specifically they (i) are naturally inclined to both competition and cooperation, (ii) have a natural tendency to fairness, (iii) are innately endowed with aversion to inequity.

⁴ It is worth noticing that at the epistemological level, the dialectic between cooperation and competition can only be approached by multi-level explanations, which aim at capturing the connections between innate inclinations, formal relational invariants, and cultural conventions: see Di Francesco, Marraffa and Pateroster (2014).

The contribution that today cognitive sciences offer to the theories of justice is very relevant. Since cognitive sciences have shown that humans have a *natural* tendency to *cooperation*, the original agreement (or social contract) should not be conceived of as a mere social construct that safeguards individuals from the possible negative outcomes of the natural tendency to competition. Instead, the original agreement is rather to be seen as the social expression of a human natural need or desire to cooperate.

Moreover, our natural tendency to *fairness* provides reasons for explaining why the members of a society ought to agree on the fundamental principles that can foster a just society. They are willing to agree on the fundamental principles of justice, not only because they seek to pursue their own interests (which they think can be best secured through an agreement on the fundamental principles), but also because the search for justice is an innate constituent of human beings as such. In other words, appealing to the individuals' natural predispositions, features and motivations to fairness helps to tackle the problem of justifying the social contract. Thus the interaction between philosophical inquiry and cognitive sciences can produce an empirically informed, and much more reliable, anthropological framework for the reflection on justice. In this perspective, individuals are not conceived of as motivated only by the pursuit of their own interest or advantage, but also by the pursuit of justice, taken as a value in itself.

It should be clear, however, that these findings are not at odds with the empirical commitments of Rawls's theory of justice. Rather, they are consistent with it; and actually they show a way for solving the impression of a tension intrinsic to that theory. In fact, at a closer scrutiny, the anthropological underpinnings of Rawls's theory are not exhausted by the notion of self-interested individuals (as in the passage mentioned above, he writes that "free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept [the social contract]"). Rawls explicitly vindicates a conception of persons as moral entities that are moved by the highest-

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order interests to realize the two powers of moral personality, which are indispensable for a person to flourish: “the capacity for a sense of right and justice” and “the capacity to decide upon, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good” (Rawls 1985, p. 365; see also Rawls 1971, p. 376). It is evident that these two moral powers presuppose the idea that humans are endowed with the capacity of being sociable and cooperative.

Even more clearly, Rawls claims that engaging in many forms of cooperation and being member of a community are conditions of human life (Rawls 1971, p. 384) and that only in a social union is the individual complete (Rawls 1971, p. 460, footnote 459). In this perspective, the idea of social union opposes the notion of a private society, where individuals or associations “have their own private ends which are either competing or independent, but not in any case complementary” (Rawls 1971, p. 457). Contrary to private society, the idea of social union conveys the importance of complementarity and interdependency, which are in turn based on the social nature of humankind (Rawls 1971, p. 458). In other words, Rawls recognizes that “we need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the success and enjoyment of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good” (ibid). And the idea of social union leads to the notion of “the community of humankind the members of which enjoy one another’s excellences and individuality”, and “they recognize the good of each as an element in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all” (ibid.).⁵

⁵ Also other advocates of liberalism, besides Rawls, have tried to complement the individualism that characterizes that view starting with its founding founders such as Locke and Mill. Therefore, besides claiming that we are autonomous choosers who employ liberty to construct our own lives, they have insisted that we also are social creatures: see Kymlicka (1989) for an interesting attempt to advocate a theory of the self that finds room for both cultural membership and various attachments and commitments which at least partially constitute the self. Generally, however, these kinds of proposals are only supported by theoretical

It seems, then, that the appeal to the social nature of human-kind goes beyond a merely individualistic anthropological understanding. However, at the same time the problem arises of whether, and in case how, it can be reconciled with the idea of self-interested individuals who compete and cooperate just because they want to secure their own interests. And, as we have seen, the idea of such reconciliation is extraneous to both the liberal and the communitarian paradigms, which respectively prioritize individualism and cooperative attitudes.

However, few decades after Rawls developed his theoretical proposal, we have found evidence that, far from being a suspicious philosophical construction at odds with the main traditional proposals, it is empirically well-grounded. In particular the apparent tension between its social, altruistic, and cooperative components, on the one side, and its individualistic side, on the other side, is confirmed by the data that come from cognitive science.

On the one hand, as said, overwhelming experimental data show that human beings actually display a natural inclination to fairness and cooperation. On the other hand, we also have very good empirical reasons for believing that cooperation requires a certain kind of individualism, to be understood in terms of the individuals' capacity to be autonomous, to discover and actualize their unique potentials and talents and form their own identity – that is, to realize themselves (Guerini and Marraffa 2017). Thus, both the social and the individualistic components of Rawls's theory of justice appear to be empirically confirmed by scientific findings and its anthropological underpinnings are enriched and made more consistent. Moreover, in this way one can also avoid the oversimplification of the communitarian perspective, according to which the very notion of the self rests on that of community and the individuals are supposed to have a sense of justice because

arguments: in our view they could benefit from also referring to the empirical findings we mention here.

they share common values with the community they belong to (and discover who they are through such a belonging) (De Caro, Giovanola and Marraffa, in preparation).

To sum up, by putting the findings of cognitive science in a dialogue with the philosophical inquiries regarding social justice, the theory of justice can be based on an anthropological model that is much sounder and much more reliable than those presupposed by the individualistic, on the one hand, and the communitarian and cosmopolitan models, on the other hand.⁶

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